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Edward Snowden’s testimony about the PRISM program has clarified the intense and widespread 
practice of surveillance on the Internet and social media by governments. The leaked documents 
provided by Snowden indicated how the PRISM program had access to users’ data from various ICT 
companies, such as Facebook, Google, Microsoft, and Apple. According to the whistleblower, the NSA 
further “impersonated Facebook in an attempt to trick users into downloading malicious code in its 
attempt to install malware on millions of computers which gives NSA control over users’ computers” 
(“NSA posed as Facebook,” 2014). The recent attack of the ransomware dubbed Wanna cry had 
victimisation rates of more than 200.000 computers in more than 150 computers and 10.000 
organizations, it affected several hospitals, governmental agencies and private companies (Liptak, 
2017). It took Equifax five months to report a hack into their servers that compromised 143.000.000 
social security numbers that allowed hackers to pretend to be any of the victims in any given 
circumstance, such as the request of a new visa card (Lynley, 2017). 
These are just some examples to show that citizens, businesses and governments are often targeted 
and impacted by what has been labelled as cybercrime. The booming of Internet technology (IT) 
creates many opportunities and permeates almost all aspects of our daily life (World Economic Forum, 
2015). Today we live in a networked society with cloud computing, online transactions and other new 
interactions made possible by internet technology (Bendovschi, 2015). Unfortunately, IT also facilitates 
existing and new threats such as cybercrime (Tsakalidis & Vergidis, 2017). Cybercrime is an umbrella 
term for different online threats such as malware, scams, hacking and surveillance  It can come as no 
surprise that cybercrime is growing globally (Interpol, 2017) given that estimated internet penetration 
of 2016 is up to more than 40% globally, for Belgium that is 88,5% (Internet live stats, 2017). This 
internet-penetration implies that more and more people are exposed to all the risks and threats that 
are inherent to the online world, cybercrime is one of them (Verdegem, Teerlinck & Vermote, 2015).  
This study is part of a systematical investigation in Belgium about the costs and impact of cybercrime. 
The overall goal of this project is to assess the harms and costs of cybercrime on the government, 
industry and citizens. The latter insights substantiate and guarantee an evidence-based and effective 
cybersecurity policy, which, in turn, helps to defend all the involved parties.  
Different research departments from the KU Leuven and the Ugent are involved in this project: the KU 
Leuven Centre for IT and IP Law (CiTiP) and the KU Leuven Institute of Criminology (LINC) as coordinator 
of the project, the KU Leuven imec-Distrinet Research Group, the KU Leuven imec-COSIC Research 
Group and the UGent imec-MICT. 
The current study focusses on Belgian citizens and their online practices in order to describe the cost 
and impact of cybercrime. Specifically, we aim to demystify the process to protection and identify core 
target groups for risk communication by means of quantitative research. Our research consists of two 
separate but consecutive survey waves (as described in Work Package 3). The first wave of WP3 has 
been undertaken by imec-MICT as is the second and last wave. The first wave consisted of a large-scale 
quantitative survey (n=1033) which was conducted in the first quarter of 2015. The current wave 
consists of a follow-up survey in the last quarter of 2017 (n=1258). These two waves give us the 
possibility to compare results of the 2015 survey with the 2017 survey and thus compare the online 
practices of the average Belgian citizen over time. 
The research leading to these results has received funding from the BRAIN-be research program of the 
Belgian Science Policy Office (BELSPO) under grant agreement number BR/132/A4/BCC. In addition, 
we would like to thank the different partners in the BCC-project for their input and support. Lastly, we 
want to thank the respondents who filled in our surveys.  
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People who are inexperienced in their internet use are more susceptible to 
cybercrime  and are typically unable to see if they have been victimized.  
 
Pessimistic defensive internet users employ various security measures to protect 
themselves against cybercrime. They don’t implement them effectively and still 
get victimized. 
 
All but experienced internet users that are optimistic about the safety of the 
internet experience some kind of opportunity costs as a result of cybercrime. 
 
More than 80% of the victimized people experienced no direct costs as a 
consequence of malware, hacking or monitoring. For scams, only 53.3% 
experienced no direct costs. 
 
The implementation of maladaptive security measures (e.g., reduction or 
complete stopping of internet use or certain activities online) declined between 
2015 and 2017. 
 
The implementation of adaptive security measures (e.g. securing Wi-Fi networks, 
Checking the source and documents for anomalies) increased between 2015 and 
2017. 
 
The perceived severity of a cybercrime and the perceived effectiveness of the 
security measures are the strongest predictors for attitude towards taking 
security measures. 
 
Subjective norm together with the attitude towards taking security measures 
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2 Theoretical background 
2.1 Cybercrime definition 
2.1.1 Cybercrime in general 
In academia and beyond there is no consensus about the concept of cybercrime and what it entails. 
Holt (2016) claims that the difficulty of defining cybercrime lies in the multidisciplinary context in which 
cybercrime resides. Some adopt the conceptualization in the justice system as a baseline to define 
cybercrime (Stratton, Powell, & Cameron, 2017). Others define cybercrime after the real-life 
counterpart (e.g. cyberstalking is defined as stalking in an online environment) (Henson, Reyns, & 
Fisher, 2016). Besides this, some researchers refer to the technical components of a specific threat 
when defining cybercrime (Van der Hulst & Neve, 2008).  
In the BCC project we aim to include all the above-described components in an overall definition to be 
holistic and all-encompassing:  
“Cybercrime comprises all computer-mediated activities, committed over electronic communication 
networks and information systems in an electronic environment, which are either illegal or 
considered illicit by certain parties and which can be conducted through all global electronic 
networks and media. These activities affect society as a whole due to their cost for and impact on 
individuals, industry and the government. They are directed against the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of automated processes/resources and focused on interfering with or affecting the 
operation of computer systems/systems that maintain automated processes.”  
Computer-mediated activities are commonly divided into computer-assisted crimes and computer-
dependent crimes, with the first being crimes that use the computer as a tool to do an already existing 
crime, and the second being a crime where the computer is the target (Europol, 2017). This division is 
widely accepted by policymakers and researchers (Li, 2016; Riek, Böhme, & Moore, 2016; Stabek, 
Watters, & Layton, 2010; Tsakalidis & Vergidis, 2017; Van der Hulst & Neve, 2008; European 
commision, 2007).  
2.1.2 Typology 
In the first wave, the typology of Anderson et al. (2013) and Holt & Bossler (2014) was used to further 
divide and categorize cyber threats. In the second wave, we fine-tuned the classification based on the 
results from the first and new insights of the Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment and other 
recent research (Europol, 2017; Rens, 2015). 
In our typology, we distinguish four types of cybercrimes; malware, scams, hacking and monitoring. 
Malware is described as one of the key threats of cyber-dependent crimes, as are attacks on 
infrastructure and network attacks commonly known as hacking (Europol, 2017).  
The two dominant malware threats are defined as ransomware and information stealers. We employ 
malware as the common nominator of viruses, ransomware and all software that alters the normal 
functioning of a device (Dang-Pham & Pittayachawan, 2015). 
Scams are described as misleading actions to get information or money, in the context of cybercrime 
these scams use existing information technologies such as email and fake websites (Anderson et al., 
2013).  
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Hacking is defined as unlawful or unauthorised access (Martellini, Abaimov, Gaycken, & Wilson, 2017; 
Verdegem, Teerlinck, & Vermote, 2015) and is linked to the key threat data breaches and network 
attacks by the Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment (Europol, 2017). 
In our typology of cybercrime, we also include activities that are considered illicit. Therefore 
monitoring was taken into account as a cybercrime even as this is not always the case from a legal 
point of view. In line with others we argue that the activity of monitoring in some occasions can be 
considered unethical and/or illicit (Dinev, Hart, & Mullen, 2008; Froomkin, 2015; Lyon, 2014; 
Verdegem et al., 2015). 
This concludes in following definitions: 
 
Malware is the malicious software that affects the normal functioning of your 
device. 
E.g. virus, worms, Trojan horses, adware, botnets, ransomware… 
 
A scam is an action whereby information or money is obtained by misleading a 
victim using information technologies.  
E.g. via mail, false websites… 
 
Hacking is obtaining unauthorized access to a computer or internet account. 
E.g. Facebook, mail... 
 
Monitoring is collecting data from a victim by the government or a private 
company. 
E.g. checking internet usage, reading e-mails... 
 
Our typology is neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive. For example, scams and monitoring are 
often caused by malware and or hacking. Besides this it is also interesting to note that malware and 
hacking are both considered computer-dependent crimes, whereas monitoring and scams are 
considered computer-assisted crimes (Li, 2016, Riek, Böhme, & Moore, 2016; Stabek, Watters, & 
Layton, 2010; Tsakalidis & Vergidis, 2017; Van der Hulst & Neve, 2008).  
2.2 Conceptualisation 
2.2.1 Victimisation  
Victimisation refers to the process and experience of being a victim of a crime (Paoli, Visschers, 
Verstraete, & van Hellemons, 2017). With some crimes, this is however not as straightforward as one 
might think. Much research solely takes into account the self-reporting of respondents to measure 
victimisation (Dodel & Mesch, 2017; Ngo & Paternoster, 2011; Rens, 2015), which, obviously does not 
include crimes that are unknown to the individual. On this topic Goucher (2010) argues that it is much 
more difficult for people to “defend themselves against an attack they may not recognise” (p.1). From 
a methodological point of view, self-reporting might lead to a bias and underestimation of 
victimisation. 
For our conceptualisation, we follow the conceptualisation of victimisation of the veiligheidsmonitor 
(Centraal bureau voor statistiek, 2016). The veiligheidsmonitor is a monitoring tool used in the 
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Netherlands where they check -among other things- the victimisation of crime. They combine the 
victimisation of the individual with the victimisation of someone in your family. 
2.2.2 Cost & Harm 
Cost 
It is important to have a general understanding of what one should understand as costs connected to 
cybercrime (Agrafiotis et al., 2016). In a systematic literature review of more than twenty studies that 
estimated the cost of cybercrime Wickramasekera, Wright, Elsay, Murray & Tubeuaf (2015) found no 
consensus about what should and should not be counted as a cost of cybercrime. Evidently, the 
measured costs were different in range across the studies. Anderson et al. (2012) differentiate 
between direct, indirect and defence costs.  
Direct costs are the monetary equivalent of losses, damages, or other suffering felt by the victim 
as a consequence of a cybercrime. 
Indirect costs are described as the monetary equivalent of the losses and opportunity costs 
imposed on society by the fact that a certain cybercrime is carried out, these include loss of trust 
and loss of opportunity. 
Defence costs are the monetary equivalent of prevention efforts. 
Anderson et al. (2012) division of the different costs was originally made to measure the total cost of 
cybercrime in response to the request of the UK Ministry of Defence to debunk overestimations of 
costs. After the study, they explicitly chose not to add up the different costs as this would show an 
opaque, context-free figure deemed meaningless (Anderson et al., 2013).  
In contrast to the approach of Anderson et al. (2012), Paoli, Visschers, Verstraete and van Hellemons 
(2017)do not have the intention to quantify every cost of cybercrime. Harm is the direct non-
quantifiable cost used in the framework of Greenfield and Paoli (2013) and is widely used as a concept 
by legislators of the EU.  
The costs also differ depending on the perspective one adopts; the victim, government and society. 
(Wickramasekera, Wright, Elsey, Murray, & Tubeuf, 2015). Greenfield and Paoli (2013) distinguish four 
perspectives or potential “bearers of harm”, namely; individuals, private-sector entities, the 
government and the social an physical environment (Greenfield & Paoli, 2013). Every bearer has its 
own relevant “interest dimensions” where harm could be experienced. In this study, we measure the 
costs through the viewpoint of the victims. For individuals, this is functional integrity, material support, 
reputation and privacy and autonomy. We combined the categorisation of Anderson et al. (2012) and 
Greenfield and Paoli (2013) of these direct costs. 
Lagazio, Sherif and Cushman (2014) proposed indirect costs as opportunity costs in their research. 
Additionally, a recent news release operationalized indirect costs as the opportunities someone lost 
because of security concerns (Eurostat, 2016).  
We combine the classifications of Anderson et al. (2013), Paoli et al. (2017) and Lagazio et al. (2014) 
and differentiate between direct costs, opportunity costs and defence costs. Direct costs, however, 
are split into the direct monetary and direct non-monetary costs. Direct non-monetary costs are 
described using the harm assessment framework with the absence of material support as interest 
dimension (as this is seen as a direct monetary cost in this research). Under opportunity costs, we see 
the indirect costs as proposed by Lagazio, Sherif and Cushman (2014) and Eurostat (2016). Defence 
costs are the last category and defined as Anderson et al. (2013). Contrary to the research on the 
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impact of cybercrime on Belgian businesses, we believe that citizens are able to estimate their 
spending on defence against cybercrime as their expenses are not bundled as in businesses (paoli et 
al., 2017). Indirect costs and defence costs are reported to be surprisingly high for cybercrime, which 
makes them of special interest (Anderson et al., 2013). We do believe however it is important to make 





Direct costs are the losses, damages, or other suffering felt by the victim as a consequence 
of a cybercrime. 
Direct monetary costs are the financial direct costs 
Direct non-monetary costs are the non-financial direct costs, considered as harm 
by Greenfield and Paoli (2013) 
  
Indirect / Opportunity costs are described as the losses imposed by the fact that a certain 
cybercrime is carried out, these include loss of trust and loss of opportunity. 
 
Defence costs are the financial costs of the prevention efforts. 
 
 
2.2.3 Security measures 
Adaptive vs maladaptive security measures 
Academics have distinguished between adaptive and maladaptive security measures for different 
threats (Chou & Sun, 2017; Crossler & Bélanger, 2014; Jansen & Van Schaik, 2017; Verdegem et al., 
2015). Adaptive security measures concern adequately protecting you against threats (Chou & Sun, 
2017). In previous research, in the cybercrime context, this was described as protective measures like 
installing anti-virus software or changing security measures (Crossler & Bélanger, 2014; Verdegem et 
al., 2015). Maladaptive security measures, on the other hand, are about not protecting yourself 
adequately against threats (Chou & Sun, 2017). In previous research, this was described as the 
reduction or complete stopping of internet use or certain activities online (Verdegem et al., 2015). This 
can also be considered opportunity costs as individuals lose the opportunity to use certain internet 
tools because of fear of cybercrime (Eurostat, 2016).  
Under adaptive security measures, we differentiate between social and technical adaptive security 
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The technical adaptive security measures we take into account are: 
o Installing free software 
o Installing paying software 
o Setting up software provided by operating system 
o Updating software and operating system 
o Securing Wi-Fi networks 
o Using hard to guess passwords 
The social adaptive security measures we take into account are: 
o Checking the source and documents for anomalies 
o Being critical when giving personal information to third parties 
The maladaptive security measures we take into account are: 
o Reducing/stopping internet usage 
o Reducing/stopping certain activities online 
 
2.2.4 Internet usage 
Internet usage is most commonly conceptualised as the frequency of internet in academic research 
(Henson et al., 2016; Marcum, Higgins, & Ricketts, 2010; Ngo & Paternoster, 2011). Often, however, 
this frequency is combined with different kinds of activities online and devices used to do so. This 
approach allows researchers to have a more holistic view of the internet usages of individuals (Dodel 
& Mesch, 2017; Henson et al., 2016; Holt & Bossler, 2014; Leukfeldt & Yar, 2016; Reyns, Henson, & 
Fisher, 2011).  
Our conceptualisation of internet usage has three sub-categories; frequency of internet use, number 
of devices used to do online activities and which activities are done online. 
 
2.2.5 Perceived internet safety 
Perceived risk is seen as the counterpart of perceived safety and can, therefore, be used as a way to 
conceptualise perceived safety (Riek et al., 2016). Perceived risk is already commonly used in other 
research about cybercrime (Hanus & Wu, 2016; Jansen, Veenstra, Zuurveen, & Stol, 2016; Riek et al., 
2016). Some research assessed the confidence in security on the basis of two dimensions: optimism 
and pessimism (De Jonge, Van Trijp, Renes, & Frewer, 2007). We used this conceptualisation to 
measure the perceived safety of the internet in general. For the conceptualisation of the perceived 
safety of the different activities we followed other research that focused on comparing the perceived 
safety, they didn’t divide between optimism and pessimism to keep everything comparable (Brownson 
et al., 2004; De Jonge et al., 2007; Verdegem et al., 2015). 
2.3 Theoretical model: Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) 
There has been a growing body of research trying to explain the overall risk of becoming victimized by 
cybercrime (Vakhitova, Reynald, & Townsley, 2016). Much of this work uses situational opportunity 
theories such as the lifestyle exposure theory, the routine activity theory or the lifestyle routine activity 
theory (Reyns, Randa, & Henson, 2016; Vakhitova et al., 2016). These studies are trying to expose the 
predictors to the chance of being victimized. Reyns et al. (2016) and Verdegem et al. (2015) argue that 
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there is, however, little known about why people would have a higher or lower intention to perform 
security-related behaviour to counter these risks of being victimized.  
In this study, we use the protection motivation theory (PMT) as our theoretical framework to 
understand people’s intention to perform security-related behaviours (Rogers, 1975). PMT is a 
cognitive model that predicts behaviour, it is used in a wide range of research domains but was 
originally developed to explain how to influence risky behaviour in health research (Milne, Sheeran, & 
Orbell, 2000).  
More recently, however, the PMT has been used in the context of cybercrime, where it is used to 
predict the motivation for protection or protective behaviour and to explain how to influence risky 
behaviour (Dang-Pham & Pittayachawan, 2015; Hanus & Wu, 2016; Herath & Rao, 2009; Jansen, 
Veenstra, Zuurveen, & Stol, 2016; Meso, Ding, & Xu, 2013; Safa et al., 2015; Shillair et al., 2015; 
Sommestad, Karlzén & Hallberg, 2015; Vance, Siponen, & Pahnila, 2012). PMT has even been used in 
the context of information security policy as well (Sommestad, Karlzén, & Hallberg, 2015). This model 
is thus ideal for the scope of this research as we try to demystify the process of the intention to take 
security measures and identify core target groups for risk communication.  
According to the PMT, the cognitive mediating process to the attitude towards behaviour consists of 
two sub-processes, threat appraisal and coping appraisal (Jansen et al., 2016). 
Threat appraisal is the cognitive process by which an individual evaluates the severity of the threat 
(=perceived severity) and the likelihood of being victimized by a certain threat (=perceived 
vulnerability) (Jansen et al., 2016). Coping appraisal is the cognitive process that answers the question 
if an individual feels him-/herself able to perform a certain security behaviour (= Self-efficacy) and the 
question if this security behaviour is effectivity to protect the individual against harm (=Response 
efficacy) (Jansen et al., 2016).  
Awareness was introduced in the PMT model by Hanus and Wu (2016), they conceptualised awareness 
in two distinctly different groups namely threat awareness and coping awareness. They found a 
positive relation between threat awareness and perceived severity and between coping awareness 
and self-efficacy and response efficacy. There was no relation found between threat awareness and 
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Figure 1 PMT-model 
We expect all these variables to have a positive relationship with the attitude towards behaviour 
(Sommestad et al., 2015). Moreover, we assume that threat awareness and coping awareness in their 
turn have a positive correlation with one another and with perceived severity, perceived vulnerability, 
self-efficacy and response efficacy as modelled and tested by Hanus and Wu (2016). Furthermore, we 
expect that attitude towards behaviour and subjective norm have a positive correlation with the 
intention towards behaviour itself as modelled and tested by Tsai et al. (2016) and Verdegem et al. 
(2015). Subjective norm is seen as the perceived social pressure to engage or not in a certain behaviour 
and is expected to have a positive influence on intention towards behaviour (Verdegem et al., 2015). 
 
2.4 Research questions 
The overall goals of the first and second wave are as follows:  
- To identify and clearly define profiles for risk communication efforts, based on the online 
activity of the Belgian citizen and the security measures he/she undertakes 
- To deepen the understanding of the different sorts of cybercrimes, their occurrence and how 
they are handled with 
- To develop a risk perception monitoring tool to identify and describe factors associated with 
the public’s intention to adopt protective measures 
- To formulate recommendations considering risk communication efforts related to cybercrime 
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RQ1: What is the state of the general Belgian population in terms of victimisation, security 
measures and costs of cybercrime? 
RQ1.1: How have victimisation rates, security measures and the costs of 
cybercrime evolved between 2015 and 2017?  
RQ2: What are the different types of groups of Internet users and their security-related 
behaviour? 
RQ2.1: Which type of users are the most vulnerable?  
RQ2.2: How has the typology evolved between 2015 and 2017?  
RQ3: What are the costs connected to cybercrime as experienced by the average Belgian 
citizen?  
RQ3.1: How have the perceived costs evolved between 2015 and 2017? 
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3 Method 
In what follows we will give you more information about the sample used in this research, furthermore, 
we will explain how we operationalized the different measures and describe the procedure of this 
research. 
3.1 Sample 
Our sample consists of 1258 valid responses and was recruited with representativeness for age, gender 
and residence in mind. In our analysis, we weighed our sample with a maximum of 1.37. 






























Table 1 Distribution by gender 
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3.1.2 Distribution by age 
 
Table 2 Distribution by age 
The ages of the respondents of our sample range from 18 to 89. The average respondent is 50 years 
old (M=49.97, SD= 16.24). If we compare our distribution by age with the one from the first wave we 
can see that we have significantly more 65+ people (p<.001), however the percentage of people in 
Belgium who are 65+ lies in between (see table 2). For further analysis, we weighed on the age groups 
to counter for the small inconsistencies between our sample and the general Belgian population.  
3.1.3 Distribution by residence 
 
 
Table 3 Distribution by residence 
 
In our sample, there is a small overrepresentation of people living in Flanders and a small 
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previous wave, we have significantly more people from Flanders (p<.01) and less from Wallonia 
(p<.01), there is no significant difference for Brussels.  
 
3.1.4 Distribution by education level 
 
Table 4 Distribution by education level  
*The data from the Belgian population is measured for 25 – 64-year-olds (OECD, 2017) 
Table 4 shows us that our sample consists of mostly Bachelors or Masters (47.9%). The second largest 
lump are respondents who completed their higher secondary (38.2%). Almost 14% of our sample didn’t 
complete their higher secondary education. We have more highly educated people in our sample than 










Lower than upper secondary
Upper Secondary
Higher than Upper Secondary
Belgian population ('16)* Sample Wave 1
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3.1.5 Distribution by employment situation 
 
Table 5 Distribution by employment situation 
In table 5 we can see that most of the people in our sample are professionally active (the coloured 
slices, 54%). This group consists of workers, clerks, management positions, professionals and civil 
servants. Almost one-third of the sample is (Semi-) retired (29.6%). This is in line with expectations as 
there is an overrepresentation of the age-group 65+ (see table 2). Most of the professionally active 
people in our sample are clerks (26%) or civil servants (14%).  
 
3.1.6 Distribution by family situation 
 

































Married/living with others with
minor children
Single without minor children
Single with minor children
Living with parent(s)/relatives
Living with others
Living in student accomodation
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Table 6 shows the distribution of our sample by family situation, the biggest part of our sample is living 
with other people (80%). 46% is married or living with their partner without minor children, 22% lives 
with their partner and minors. 20% of the people in our sample lives alone.  
3.2 Measures 
In this section, we operationalize the concepts as described and delineated in section 2.2. All scales 
that are mentioned were rated on a 5-point Likert scale if not otherwise stated, ranging from “totally 
disagree” to “totally agree”. In some occasions, the option “I don’t know (it)” was added to prevent 
bias. Reliability of the scales was measured using Cronbach’s alpha. If not stated otherwise we didn’t 
change the operationalization of the first wave. For a full overview of all questions, we refer to 
appendix A. 
3.2.1 Demographics 
The first set of questions asked the respondents for their demographic information. We measured the 
respondents’ gender, age, language, residence, profession, diploma and family situation. We 
preserved all of the questions from the first wave. Demographics were mainly used to check the 
representativeness of the sample and descriptive analyses.  
3.2.2 Online activity 
Different components of online activity were measured; access to certain devices, the uses of these 
devices, the location where respondents are online, and the frequency of internet use and the 
frequency of different online activities. The measures are based on the first wave (Verdegem et al., 
2015). We did add some categories to get more fine-grained responses (for example, we added to 
category “between 5 to 8 hours” when measuring their internet frequency).  
3.2.3 Awareness 
To operationalize awareness, we differentiated between awareness of cybercrime and awareness of 
security mechanisms, as was recommended by Hanus & Wu (2016). Every concept was questioned on 
a five-point Likert scale ranging from “totally not aware” to “totally aware”. 
3.2.4 The perceived security of the internet and internet-related activities 
The confidence and perceived security of the internet in general and specific internet-related activities 
were operationalized in line with previous work of Verdegem et al. (2015) and de Jonge et al. (2007). 
The former addresses the perceived optimism and pessimism about the security of the internet and 
combines these concepts into the perceived security of the internet. For the latter, we asked how safe 
they perceived various online activities ranging from “not safe at all” to “very safe”. 
3.2.5 Cybercrime victimisation 
We based the operationalization of victimisation on the yearly in-depth monitoring tool of the 
Netherlands (Veiligheidsmonitor, 2017). In this monitoring tool, the victimisation of a respondent is 
the victimisation of themselves or someone in their household in the last 12 months. 
Some questions were only asked at reported victims of cybercrime such as the direct costs monetary 
and non-monetary (cfr. supra) and reporting of the crime. 
3.2.6 Cybercrime cost 
Four different types of cost were operationalized; namely direct monetary cost, direct non-monetary 
cost (~harm), opportunity costs and defence costs. 
In line with Verdegem et al. (2015) we operationalized direct monetary costs as an open question 
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where we asked about the financial costs as a direct consequence of a certain. 
To measure the direct non-monetary costs we used the operationalization of the harm assessment 
framework (Greenfield & Paoli, 2013; Paoli et al., 2017). The direct non-monetary costs included in our 
study are three-fold: daily activities, privacy and reputation. Harm was operationalized as a 6-point 
scale going from “harmless” to “catastrophic”. We included the option “does not apply” to prevent 
bias. These questions were only visible to those who stated they were victimized in a previous answer. 
Opportunity costs are measured using three techniques. Firstly, we have the direct questions that 
measure opportunity costs against online banking, online shopping and the use of social network sites 
(Eurostat, 2016). Secondly, we have the maladaptive security measures who implicate opportunity 
costs (Chou & Sun, 2017; Crossler & Bélanger, 2014; Jansen & van Schaik, 2017). Finally, we calculated 
the correlation between the frequency of use of a certain activity and its perceived security. These 
questions were asked to all respondents and not only those who stated to be a victim. 
Defence costs consist of the monetary equivalent of prevention efforts (Anderson et al., 2012). We 
operationalized defence cost like direct costs with an open question (Verdegem et al., 2015). 
Sometimes these costs are considered irrelevant to take into account to measure the cost of 
cybercrime as these would inflate the total amount and would sketch an image not true to life, this 
consideration is certainly relevant when talking about businesses or governments (Paoli et al., 2017). 
For other internet-users, however, the defence costs are seen as relevant as these could have an 
impact on the adoption and use of certain internet activities or internet as a whole. Therefore we chose 
to include defence costs in this wave. With these concerns, however, it is important to divide the total 
cost into these transparent chunks, namely direct monetary costs, direct non-monetary costs, 
opportunity costs and defence costs. The questions concerning the former two were asked at victims, 
the latter two were asked independently of their victimisation.  
3.2.7 PMT model  
The PMT model was used in the first wave as well and we retained the operationalization of the 
different constructs in the PMT model (Verdegem et al., 2015). We did, however, change the scope of 
the questions. In the first wave, all the PMT-questions were about cybercrime in general. We chose to 
diversify and – next to cybercrime in general – also include the questions for the independent variables 
of malware and of scams. Doing this we follow the recommendation by Marakas et al. (2007) that 
stated that the measures should fit the context being studied as good as possible. It also makes it 
possible to zoom in on two specific cybercrimes. We chose for malware and scams as these were the 
two crimes where people were respectively the most and least victimized from in the first wave 
(Verdegem et al., 2015). These crimes were furthermore the two cybercrimes that people were most 
aware of (Verdegem et al., 2015).  
All the independent variables are validated in other research and all but awareness is already used in 
the previous wave (Dang-Pham & Pittayachawan, 2015; Hanus & Wu, 2016; Herath & Rao, 2009; Meso 
et al., 2013; Verdegem et al., 2015). We asked all the questions about the perceived severity and the 
perceived vulnerability for all the crimes separately but not for cybercrime in general. The questions 
about self-efficacy, response efficacy, attitude towards security-related behaviour, intentions to 
perform security-related behaviour and subjective norm, we asked for malware, scams and cybercrime 
in general. This way we were able to get finer grained information about all variables and not 
exaggerate with the amount of questions. 
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The dependent variable of the PMT-model is “attitude towards security-related behaviour”, we 
however also measured how the intention is to perform this security-related behaviour and if the 
subjective norm has an influence on this intention together with the attitude. 
Independent variables included in the original PMT-model: 
 Awareness of cyber-threat 
 Awareness of security measure 
 Perceived Severity 
 Perceived Vulnerability 
 Response Efficacy 
 Self-efficacy 
Dependent variables included in the PMT-model: 
 Attitude towards security-related behaviour 
Dependent and independent variables outside of the original PMT-model 
 Intentions to perform security-related behaviour 




In order to answer the research questions, the research group imec-MICT launched an online survey 
in the beginning of October 2017. The participants were recruited by iVox - a professional market 
research agency. An URL to the questionnaire was available for 3 weeks and incentives in form of gift 
vouchers were handed out to a number of randomly picked participants. A total number of 2132 
people started the survey. Of these 2132 people, 1258 were retained after validation. This validation 
was done using three measures.  
- The respondents needed to answer a control variable (“tick the box totally disagree”) correctly. 
- They needed fill in the survey in a credible time-frame (>10 minutes)  
- They needed complete 90% of the survey.  
o For analysis concerning the remaining 10% of the survey, the missing values were 
disregarded.  
On average it took a respondent 19 minutes (trimmed mean) to complete the survey. Our sample is 
representative for age, gender and residence with a maximum weighing of 1.371. In the questionnaire, 
we included the definitions of the cybercrimes with a follow-up question and didn’t let the respondent 
continue if they answered wrong on this follow up question. In addition, we included an interactive 
way so respondents could look up the definitions of every cybercrime by hovering over the term any 
                                                          
1 This weighing was conducted to counteract the under- and overrepresentation of the age groups 55-64 and 
65+. We weigh our sample to get a perfect distribution on age. The other variable are not severely under or 
overrepresented. The quota for representativeness are based on the statistics of BE.stat and OECD (FOD 
Economie, 2017).   
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time the term was presented in a question. We argue that these implementations further validate our 
research and its results.  
To answer RQ1, RQ1.1, RQ2.1, RQ2.2, RQ3 and RQ3.1 we used descriptive and comparative analysis 
(𝜒2-test, Mann-Whitney, Kruskal-Walis, Wilcoxon, One-Way Anova, t-tests, spearman correlation) 
dependent on the levels of data to answer our research question. Some analysis are done only on the 
victims of cybercrime, these analysis are exclusively explorative of nature and do not possess the 
power to be extrapolated to the Belgian population.  
The clusters used to answer RQ2, RQ2.1 and RQ2.2 are constructed using PCA & Cluster analysis (just 
as in the first wave)  
At last, we created a SEM-model to answer RQ 4 where we analysed the PMT-model and compared 
this between malware, scams and cybercrime in general. Furthermore, we ran a SEM-model for the 
model for different relevant clusters to get a better insight. To use the perceived severity and perceived 
vulnerability in the SEM model for cybercrime in general we made a sumscale of those items per 
cybercrime, as they were not asked for cybercrime in general. For cybercrime in general only malware, 
scams and hacking were included as monitoring is strictly not seen as a cybercrime (Dinev et al., 2008; 
Froomkin, 2015; Lyon, 2014). For the specific SEM-models for malware and scams, no sumscales were 
used. 
The analysis was done using SPSS 24 and Amos 22, every analysis is checked for his/her assumptions, 
there were no violations found except when explicitly stated in the analysis. 
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4 Results 
4.1 Victimisation, security measures and costs of cybercrime of the general population 
(RQ1)  
In a first section we aim to answer the first research question as formulated in section 2.4.: “What is 
the state of the general Belgian population in terms of victimisation, security measures and costs of 
cybercrime?”  
4.1.1 Online activities: activities undertaken & activity security 
 
Table 7 Total sample: Online activities 
Considering the activities one performs online we see a big difference between the frequencies of 
these activities (see Table 7). In our sample, the respondents score the lowest on online shopping. 
Moreover, many activities we included in this study are (almost) never performed. (e.g. Chatting, 
gaming, downloading, electronic banking). Checking E-mails, activity on Social Network Sites and 












Never Less than once a week Once a week More than once a week
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Table 8 Total sample: perceived security of online activities 
If we take a look at the perceived security of a certain activity we can conclude that downloading is 
seen as the least safe activity (with most people stating it is totally unsafe) followed by social media, 
online gaming, chatting and streaming (see table 8). Interestingly is that for every activity at least 15% 
state that they find that activity “not safe” or less safe. In other words, every activity online is seen as 
somewhat unsafe by more than one in seven people. More than half (57.0%) of the people who do or 
at least know downloading, perceive it as “not safe” or less safe. Almost half of the people who use or 
at least know social network sites (49.3%) and online gaming (48.7%) also perceive it as “not safe” or 
less safe. Less than 20% of the population perceive Downloading, Social media or online gaming as 
“safe” or safer.  
Furthermore, we can conclude that there is 
a big fraction of the population perceiving 
electronic banking (16.24%), visiting news 
sites (12.92%) and e-mail (9.35%) as very 
safe. It is also important to note that for 
some activities there is quite a big group of 
the respondents that didn’t know or didn’t 
perform the activity. 
Correlations between online activity and perceived safety 
After a two-tailed Spearman correlation between the perceived security of an activity and its frequency 
of use, we find that there are quite a few activities where this correlation is significant. Six of the 
activities have a significant correlation that is higher than .200 (see table 9). Hence, the higher their 
frequency of doing an online activity, the higher the perceived safety of that particular activity. Only 
for email and downloading this relation is not significant.  
 















































































Perceived safety of online activity 
Totally unsafe Not safe Neutral Safe Very safe I don't know/ I don't do this
Less than 20% of the people perceive 
downloading, social media use or online 
games as at least safe 
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Information retrieval .077** <.01 
News sites .125** <.01 
E-mail .042 .054 
Electronic Banking .122** <.01 
Online gaming .356** <.01 
Social Media .266** <.01 
Chatting .308** <.01 
VoIP .274** <.01 
Purchase or sell goods .227** <.01 
Download .052 .094 
Streaming .287** <.01 
Table 9 Total sample: Correlations between online activity & perceived safety 
This correlation could indicate opportunity costs as people who perceive a certain activity as less safe 
are performing this activity less often. Surprisingly this correlation is less strong for activities that are 
perceived safer like information retrieval, visiting news sites and electronic banking (cfr. Supra). 
Downloading and email, however, is not following this trend.  
4.1.2 Security measures 
 
Table 10 Total sample: Amount of security measures taken 
Analysing the number of security measures one takes we see that the most measures are taken against 
malware and hacking (see table 10). It is important to note that even with the lowest average amount 
of security measures being 3.09 security measures, there are for every crime between 7.4% and 25.6% 
that do not implement any of the proposed 
measures as a security measure. This makes 
them especially vulnerable to cybercrime. 
Interestingly more than one in four people 
do not take any security measure against 
monitoring, they do however averagely use 
more than three security measures to 
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Table 11 Total sample: percentage of people who perform certain security measures 
 
Almost 10% (9.7%) is reducing their internet usage and 16.5% is reducing or stopping certain activities 
online, these security measures are described as maladaptive and incorporate opportunity costs 
(yellow bars). In comparison with the other security measures this is much lower, but still more than 
one in ten Belgians are implementing a maladaptive security measure of any kind (see table 11).  
Most people protect themselves by using 
social adaptive security measures such as 
checking the origin and documents before 
opening and being vigilant when giving info 
to third parties. It is however impossible to 
know if these social security measured (green bars) are applied in an effective way. This is dependent 
on the knowledge and skills of the person implementing these social adaptive security measures. If 
this is not the case, these social adaptive security measures will, of course, have no impact on the 
defence people have against cybercrime. 
For every adaptive technical security measure (blue bars) - besides paying for software (42,3%) - the 
majority of people is using them. This means that less than 50% is willing to pay for their security 
measures. The recent trend of including security measures in operating systems for free is thus a good 













Percentage of people who perform certain security measures
More than one in ten people implement 
maladaptive security measures 
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Table 12 Total sample: amount of security measures in total 
With 84% of the people using four or more security measures and more than half using six or more 
security measures, most people are taking 
security serious (see table 12). There are 
however still 5.2% of the people who take 
no security measures whatsoever and more 
than 10% implementing two or fewer 




Table 13 Total sample: victimisation rate 
With 17%, malware caused for the most 
victims the last 12 months (see table 13). 
People were least confronted with scams. 
The data also shows how most people are 
uncertain about monitoring. A total of 33% 
did not know if they were monitored or not 
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Malware Scams Hacking Monitoring
Victimization rate
Victim Not-victim I don't know
More than 5% of the people implements 
no security measures at all 
Most victims were caused by malware 
in 2017 
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Table 14 Total sample: security measures taken against cybercrime by victimisation 
A one-way Anova shows a difference between victims, non-victims and those who do not know if they 
are victimized by Malware considering their amount of security measures. (F(2)=9.068 p<.001) A post 
hoc analysis using Scheffe further indicates no significant difference between the victims and the non-
victims. There is, however, a significant difference between the victims (M=5.2215 SD=2.28135) and 
the unknowing (M=4.1884 SD=2.92571) (p<.01) and the non-victims (M=5.1025 SD=2.36944) and the 
unknowing (p<.001) (see table 14).  
There is no significant difference in security measures for scams between victims, non-victims and 
unknowing (F(2)=1.769, p=.171). 
For Hacking there is a significant difference between all the groups (F(2)=8.895, p<.001) with the post 
hoc analysis using Scheffe showing that the victims are having significantly more security measures in 
place (M=5.1239 SD=2.52641) followed by the non-victims (M=4.3752 SD=2.54037) and then the 
unknowing (M=3.8253 SD=2.59582)2. 
For monitoring the one-way Anova with a post hoc using Scheffe also shows a significant difference 
between the victims (M=3.5407 SD=2.66390) and the unknowing (M=2.8110 
SD=2.57896)(p<.05)(F(2)=4.876, p<.01), where the unknowing implement fewer security measures 
than the victims.  
In three of the four cybercrimes the respondents who stated they didn’t know if they were victimized 
implemented significantly fewer security measures than at least one other group. This makes this 
unaware group especially vulnerable.  
                                                          













Malware Scams Hacking Monitoring
Security measures against cybercrime by 
victimization
Victim Non-victim I don't know
Those who do not know if they were victimized implemented less 
security measures, this is true for three of four cybercrimes 
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4.1.4 Cybercrime Cost (RQ3) 
Direct monetary cost3  
 
Table 15 Total sample: direct monetary costs by cybercrime 
If we take a look at the monetary costs that are the direct consequence of a certain cybercrime, we 
can conclude that scams are the costliest of cybercrimes. More than 80% of the victims of malware, 
hacking or monitoring paid €0 as direct costs. 46.7% of the victims of scams, however, reported a direct 
cost of more than €0. 10% of the victims of scams even reported a loss of more than €1000. More than 
25% of the victims of scams reported a loss of more than €100 (see table 15).  
In comparison, just 18.6% of the victims of malware, 16.2% of the victims of hacking and 9% of the 
victims of monitoring reported a direct loss of any amount.  
Of the victims of malware, only 6.5% stated a bigger loss than €100. Of the victims of hacking, this is 
7.2%, of the victims of monitoring this is 2.8%.  
Direct non-monetary cost 
No significant differences were found when comparing the sumscale (malware: 𝛼=.886, 
scams: 𝛼=.915, hacking: 𝛼=.872, monitoring: 𝛼=.841) of the harm against daily activities, privacy and 
reputation for malware (M=2.6783 SD=1.32443), scams (M=2.5991 SD=1.42012), hacking (M=2.8775 
                                                          
3 Averages are not being reported because the amount of respondents that paid direct costs is too low, with only 
37 for malware, only 42 for scams, 18 for hacking and 13 for monitoring and because some outliers would 
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More than 80% of the victims of malware, hacking or monitoring paid 
€0 as a direct cost 
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SD=1.41128) or monitoring (M=2.5809 SD=1.30074). This means that the harm done by a cybercrime 
is perceived equally harmful for the different cybercrimes. 
 
 
Table 16 Total sample: direct non-monetary cost by cybercrime (1=harmless, 2=insignificant, 3=moderate, 4=serious, 5=grave, 
6=catastrophic) 
More than 50% of the victims of malware and more than half of the victims of hacking state that their 
daily activities were moderately or more harmed by the cybercrime (see table 16). On the other hand 
just more than 25% of the victims of monitoring state that monitoring has moderately harmed or worse 
their daily activities. If we look at reputation we see for more than 25% of the victims of scams or 
hacking this incident was perceived as a considerably harmful or worse for their reputation.  
50% of all but the victims of scams state that they perceived the harm to their privacy as moderate or 
higher. For more than 25% of the victims of monitoring, this was even considered serious, for the other 
crimes more than 25% of the victims considered the incident as considerably harmful to their privacy. 
Opportunity cost 
If we look at the direct questions about opportunity costs, 5.9% of the sample agrees that they reduced 
or stopped the use of electronic banking because of the threat of cybercrime. For online shopping, this 
is a higher 10.4% and for social network sites, this is 9%.  
If we look at the maladaptive security measures we can see that 9.7% of the sample is reducing or 
stopping internet use as a security measure, even 16.5% of the population reduce or stop certain 
activities online as a security measure. 
The correlations between the perceived security of a certain activity and its frequency of use shows us 
that there is quite a big opportunity cost as electronic banking (r=.122, p<.001), social network sites 
(r=.266, p<.001) and purchasing goods online (r=.227, p<.001) have a significant correlation, this 
Q1 Median Q3 Q1 Median Q3 Q1 Median Q3
Malware 2 3 4 1 2 3 1 3 4
Scams 1 2 4 1 2 4 1 2 4
Hacking 1 3 4 1 2 4 1,9 3 4
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combined with the direct questions about these activities makes us believe that people experience 
opportunity costs for these activities. Furthermore other activities such as online gaming (r=.356, 
p<.001), chatting(r=.308, p<.001), VoIP (.274, p<.001) or streaming (r=.287, p<.001) have an even 
stronger relationship between their frequency and perceived security. 
The combination of these three methods gives us the insight that there is quite a big opportunity cost 
that people experience as a result of cybercrime.  
Defence cost 
 
Table 17 Total sample: defence costs 
If we compare the defence costs of the different cybercrimes we can see that malware (M=€61.99 
SD=€43,16) and hacking (M=€62.75 SD=€92.39) are considered the most expensive (see table 17). 
Interestingly the median of all crimes is around €50. Which means that if someone pays for a defence 
against cybercrime, approximately half of them pay less than €50 and half of them pay more than €50, 
independent of the cybercrime. The costs of cybercrime in general are not much higher than the cost 
of the cybercrimes separately. It is likely that when people defend themselves against one crime, they 
also defend themselves against other crimes with this action.  
4.1.5 Conclusion  
In general, people are using the internet the most for information linked activities such as checking 
their emails, retrieving information, searching news websites and social networking. There is a clear 
positive relationship between the frequency of the different activities one performs online and the 
perceived security of those activities. Furthermore, we can conclude that people develop different 
Mean SD 25% 50% 75%
Malware 61,99 € 43,16 € 40,00 € 50,00 € 75,00 €
Scams 51,40 € 34,94 € 28,40 € 50,00 € 66,18 €
Hacking 62,75 € 92,39 € 35,00 € 55,00 € 70,00 €
Monitoring 53,48 € 70,51 € 16,50 € 50,00 € 60,00 €













Scams made the least victims but cause the highest direct financial 
costs 
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measures to protect themselves, not to say that these measures are adequate or effective. In general, 
most people were confronted with malware, followed by monitoring, hacking and then scams. Scams, 
however, caused for the highest direct financial cost linked to it.  
Victims of hacking employ more security measures than non-victims. It is, however, difficult to know if 
they were victimized and as a result implemented more security measures or if they were victimized 
despite the security measures. Furthermore, it is important to conclude that in almost all cybercrimes 
the people who didn’t know if they were victimized implemented fewer security measures compared 
to victims and non-victims.  
Most victims do not experience direct costs as a consequence of an incident. Scams are the costliest 
of cybercrimes if it comes to direct costs. Almost half of the victims of scams state they’ve suffered 
direct monetary loss. Besides direct costs, there are many Belgian citizens who experience opportunity 
costs to some extent. These opportunity costs are felt in their online behaviour linked to the perceived 
safety of these activities but also in the maladaptive coping mechanisms implemented by more than 
one in ten people. Belgians spend most money defending themselves against malware and hacking. 
These are, however, not the cybercrimes 
with the highest direct costs. They are not 
stacking costs for different cybercrimes as 
most people pay money just once to defend 
themselves against all cybercrimes. 
  
There are many Belgian citizens who 
experience opportunity costs 
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4.2 Typologies of internet users and their security-related behaviour (RQ2)  
In a similar fashion to the first wave, we created clusters of people who share the same characteristics. 
This way we can have a better understanding of the practices of Internet users and their security-
related behaviour. Following variables were used to differentiate in the typologies:  
- Frequency of internet use 
- Variety of internet use 
- Variety of security measures 
- Perceived security of the internet 
Based on the analysis we differentiate between five groups:  
- The optimistic defensive internet users (ODI) 
- The pessimistic defensive internet users (PDI) 
- The inexperienced unknowing internet users (IUI) 
- The pessimistic experienced internet users (PEI) 
- The optimistic experienced internet users (OEI) 
In what follows we describe the different clusters in terms of general information which contains 
demographic information, their internet diet, their implemented security measures and their 
victimisation rate. Furthermore we compare this information and the costs and impact perceived by 
the different typologies. We can see that there are significant differences in age category (𝜒2 (16) = 
192.03, p<.001), residence (𝜒2 (8) = 22.72, p<.01), gender (𝜒2(4)=10.39, p<.05), education 
(𝜒2(8)=32.40, p<.001) and profession (𝜒2(40)=147.84, p<.001) for these different clusters. There is no 




Results - Typologies of internet users and their security-related behaviour (RQ2)  
4.2.1 The Optimistic defensive internet user (ODI) 
Internet diet & perceived safety of online activities  
If we take a look at the internet diet of an ODI, we can 
conclude that they mainly use the internet to visit news sites, 
as more than 75% of them does this at least once a day. Also 
searching the internet for information and email are done 
quite often – 75% of them does this at least once a week. 
They also use the internet for electronic banking and social 
network sites. Half of them use social network sites at least 
daily. Buying and selling goods online is rarely done, with half 
of them doing it at least monthly. The average ODI does not 
or to a lesser extend game, chat, use VoIP, download or 
stream.  
The ODI’s perceive the different activities online generally as 
neutral to safe, more than 75% perceive information 
retrieval, visiting news-sites, e-mail, 
electronic banking and Calling over the 
internet (=VoIP) as neutral or safer (see 
table 18). For the other activities there 
are still more than 50% that think those 
activities are “neutral” or safer. They 
are the only cluster where more than 
half of them perceive downloading as 
“neutral” or safer. Hence, this cluster is 
more optimistic about the Internet. 
Security measures taken 
If we look at the different kinds of 
security measures, we see that 10,2% of 
Internet diet 
ODI - Passport 
Demographics 
- Older (M=53 SD=14.8) 
o More 55-65 (p<.05) 
o Less 18-35 (p<.001) 
- More from Wallonia (p<.05) 
- More men/Less woman (p<.05) 
- More (semi-)retired people (p<.05) 
14.7% 
- Top tasks online 
o Visiting news sites 
o Searching information 
o Social network sites 
Online perceived safety 















Update OS & software
Secure wifi
Use hard to guess passwords
Check sender and content for anomalies
Be carefull with third parties
Decrease or stop internet usage
Decrease or stop certain activities online












Perceived safety of online activity ODI
Totally unsafe Not safe Neutral Safe Very safe
Table 18 ODI: Perceived safety of online activity 
Table 19 ODI: Security measures taken 
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these users will reduce their internet usage in total and 11,4% will reduce certain activities online (see 
table 19). These maladaptive security measures are done least of the security measures but still more 
than one in ten ODI’s misses opportunities in some way by implementing these maladaptive security 
measures.  
There is a very high adoption of social adaptive security measures with 89,1% checking the origin and 
content for anomalies and 95,9% being careful when sharing content with third parties.  
Also, adaptive technology security measures are adapted quite often by ODI’s. With adoption rates 
ranging from at least more than half (51,3%) that pay for security software, to 92.1% who uses hard to 
guess passwords. 
Victimisation rate ODI  
 
Table 20 ODI: Victimisation rate 
Hacking (9,9%), malware (10,3%) and monitoring (10,0%) are the crimes from which most ODI’s state 
that they (or someone in their family) were a victim of the last 12 months (see table 20). 24,2% of the 
ODI’s state that they have been a victim of at least one of these cybercrimes. There are significantly 
less ODI’s being victimized than expected 
by malware (p<.01) and significantly 
more not being victimized than expected 
by malware (p<.001) (𝜒2(8)=19.619, 
p<.05). There are also significantly more 
ODI’s not being victimized by hacking than expected (p<.01) (𝜒2(8)=30.061, p<.001). The same is true 
for monitoring (p<.001) (𝜒2(8)=47.766, p<.001). We can thus conclude that ODI’s are in general less 





















Malware Scams Hacking Monitoring
Victimization rate
Yes No I don't know Average
The ODI’s are in general less victimized 
than one should expect 
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4.2.2 The pessimistic defensive internet user (PDI) 
Internet diet & perceived safety of online activities  
The internet diet of the PDI’s is very comparable to the one 
of the ODI’s. With more than 75% of them sending & 
receiving emails and visiting news sites at least daily, at least 
50% of them using social network sites at least daily, 75% of 
them retrieving information at least weekly, and 75% of them 
using electronic banking at least monthly, there is a big 
overlap in online behaviour. However in this cluster also 
more than half of them streams content at least monthly.  
If we look at the perceived safety of the online activities we 
can clearly see that the PDI is perceiving the activities, in 
general, less safe than the ODI. More than 50% of the PDI’s 
perceive online gaming, social media 
and downloading as “not safe” or less 
(see table 21). Only electronic 
banking, information retrieval, visiting 
news sites and e-mailing is perceived 
by more than 30% of the PDI’s as 
“safe” or “very safe”. 
Security measures taken 
There is not one respondent of the 
PDI’s that has less than five security 
measures in place, this is to be 
expected as this is the group that is the most defensive of our sample. With an average of 7.10 security 
measures (SD= 1.27) they also have the highest average of security measures in place. They have most 
security measures in place to counter malware (Mean=7.05 SD=1.53) followed by hacking (Mean= 6.77 
SD=1.54), scams (Mean=6.19 SD=1.76) and monitoring (Mean= 5.80 SD=2.15). 
Internet diet 
PDI - Passport 
Demographics 
- Older (M=51 SD=14.2) 
o More 45-54 (p<.01) 
o Less 18-34 (p<.01) 
- Lower education 
o More highest secondary 
degree (p<.05) 
23.4 % 
- Top tasks online 
o Sending & recieving email 
o Visiting news sites 
o Searching information 
o Social network sites 
Online perceived safety 
- Very low trust in the internet 












Perceived safety of online activity PDI















Update OS & software
Secure wifi
Use hard to guess passwords
Check sender and content for anomalies
Be carefull with third parties
Decrease or stop internet usage
Decrease or stop certain activities online
Table 21 PDI: Perceived safety of online activity 
Table 22 PDI: Security measures taken 
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Striking is that there is also a big fraction of PDI’s that apply maladaptive security measures such as 
decreasing or stopping internet usage (19.9%) and decreasing or stopping certain activities online 
(32.7%) (See table 22). This percentage is significantly higher than all the other clusters for reducing or 
stopping internet usage (p<.001)(𝜒2(4)=50.752, p<.001) and reducing or stopping certain activities 
online (p<.001)(𝜒2(4)=78.310, p<.001). These maladaptive security measures cause high opportunity 
costs for this profile.  
Also, the adaptive security measures both social and technical are being heavily implemented by the 
PDI’s. More than 70% is using free software to protect themselves and their families against 
cybercrime. An even higher 93.4% is trying to update frequently. One would expect that all these 
security measures would result in a lower victimisation rate. 
Victimisation rate PDI  
 
Table 23 PDI: Victimisation rate 
This is however not the case, with malware (17.6%), monitoring (17.1%), hacking (12.9%) and scams 
(10.4%). There are overrepresentations of the PDI’s that are victimized by hacking 
(p<.05)(𝜒2(8)=30.061, p<.001) and 
monitoring (p<.05) (𝜒2(8)=47.766, p<.001) 
(see table 23). 37.7% of the PDI’s state that 
they or someone in their family have been 
the victim of at least one cybercrime last 
year.  
These findings could suggest that these PDI’s are not implementing their security measures in a correct 























Malware Scams Hacking Monitoring
Victimization rate
Yes No I don't know Average
37.7% of the PDI’s state their family was 
victimized at least once last year 
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4.2.3 Inexperienced unknowing internet user (IUI) 
Internet diet & perceived safety of online activities  
The IUI’s use the internet significantly less than all the other 
groups (p<.001). If they do use the internet, they use it 
mainly for information retrieval, visiting news sites and 
searching for information with 75% of them doing these 
activities at least once a week. Another part of their internet 
diet is electronic banking with 75% of them doing this at least 
monthly and social network sites with more than 50% of 
them doing this weekly. All the other activities are done 
yearly or never by 75% of the IUI’s.  
They perceive the different internet 
activities mostly as “neutral” or “safe”, 
especially the activities they perform 
online (see table 24). With more than 
half of them perceiving searching information, visiting news websites, emailing and electronic banking 
as at least “safe”. Only online gaming, using social network sites and downloading are perceived as 
“not safe” or less by at least 50% of the cluster. The rest is perceived generally neutrally to safe. It is, 
however, important to know that the IUI have significantly more people not knowing what a certain 
online activity is or not doing a certain activity online (see table 33). 
Security measures taken 
The IUI’s have by far the least security measures in place (Mean=4.28 SD=2.54). 13,7% of the cluster 
has no security measure in place whatsoever. With 19.8% of this cluster seeking no protection for 
malware, 33.1% seeking no protection against scams, 28.2% not protecting themselves against hacking 
and more than half (53.7%) not protecting themselves against monitoring, this cluster has a big group 
of vulnerable people. If they protect themselves it is more often than not with few security measures.  
If we take a look at the different security measure, we can see that significantly fewer people from the 
IUI’s are implementing free software (p<.01)(𝜒2(4)= 36.823, p<.001), included software (p<.001) 
(𝜒2(4)=96.639, p<.001), updating OS & Software (p<.001)(𝜒2(4)=140.19, p<.001), securing Wi-Fi 
(p<.001)(𝜒2(4)=136.807, p<.001), use hard to guess passwords (p< .001)(𝜒2(4)=137.038, p<.001), 
check sender and content for anomalies (p<.001)(𝜒2(4)= 125.470, p<.001) and are careful with third 
Internet diet 
IUI - Passport 
Demographics 
- Older (M=56 SD=15.00) 
o More 65+ (p<.001) & 55-65 
(p<.05) 
o Less 18-34 (p<.001) 
- Less white collar worker 
o Less clerks (p<.001) & 
management (p<.05) 
o More (semi-)retired (p<.001) 
- Lower education 
o More highest secondary 
degree (p<.001) 
o Less at least a bachelor 
degree (p<.05) 
- Less men/More woman (p<.05) 
24.9%  
- Top tasks online 
o Visiting news sites 
o Searching information 
o Social network sites 
- Less often than the rest (p<.001) 
 
Online perceived safety 
- Slightly less safe than average 












Perceived safety online activity IUI
Totally unsafe Not safe Neutral Safe Very safe
Table 24 IUI: Perceived safety of activity 
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parties (p<.01) (𝜒2(4)=101.898, p<.001) (see table 25). One should expect that with this security profile 
they would be victimized more often than the other clusters. 
Victimisation rate IUI  
 
Table 26 IUI: Victimisation rate 
Yet, if we look at the victimisation rate itself, there is no overrepresentation of the victimisation of any 
of the cybercrimes. There is even a slight significant underrepresentation of people victimized by 
hacking (p<.01)(𝜒2(8)=30.061, p<.001) and monitoring (p<.05)(𝜒2(8)=47.766, p<.001). Malware 
(15.50%), is just as in any other cluster the cybercrime where most IUI’s were victimized followed by 
monitoring (9.50%), hacking (5.90%) and Scams (5.90%) (See table 26).  
The low victimisation numbers of the IUI’s could, however, be explained by the difference in internet 
diet and/or the possibility that they don’t notice or are not able to notice if their computer is 
























Malware Scams Hacking Monitoring
Victimization rate















Update OS & software
Secure wifi
Use hard to guess passwords
Check sender and content for anomalies
Be carefull with third parties
Decrease or stop internet usage
Decrease or stop certain activities online
Table 25 IUI: Security measures taken 
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4.2.4 Pessimistic experienced internet users (PEI) 
Internet diet & perceived safety of online activities  
The PEI’s use the internet on the one hand for traditional 
tasks such as email, searching information and visiting news 
sites. More than 75% of the PEI’s do these activities at least 
once a day. On the other hand, they use the internet for 
social tasks such as social networks, with more than half 
doing this more times a day or chatting with more than half 
doing this at least once a week. Also, electronic banking is 
done often with more than 75% using it at least monthly as 
is streaming with half of them doing this at least weekly. 
Gaming, selling and buying goods, VoIP and downloading are 
still done at least once a year by more than 50% of the PEI’s. 
The internet diet of the PEI’s resembles heavily the one of 
the OEI’s.  
The perceived safety of the different 
activities of the PEI’s (see table 27) is 
rather low and comparable with the 
PDI’s (see table 21). There is only one 
activity where more than half of the 
PEI’s perceive the activity at least 
“safe”, namely visiting news sites. For 
searching information online, emailing, 
electronic banking, VoIP, Buy & Sell 
goods online and streaming more than half of the PEI’s perceive the activity less safe than “safe”. For 
social network sites, online gaming, chatting and downloading this fraction even rises to more than 
75%. 
Security measures taken 
4.8% of the PEI’s don’t use any of the security measures to protect themselves against any kind of 
cybercrime. On average, the PEI’s protect themselves using 5.54 security measures (SD=2.15). Also 
here malware (M=4.56 SD=2.03) is the cybercrime from which they protect themselves the most, 
followed by hacking (M=3.92 SD=2.22), scams (M=2.84 SD=1.80) and monitoring (M=2.22 SD=1.93). 
Quite a lot of the PEI’s are implementing adaptive social security measures with 73.5% checking the 
sender and content for anomalies and 88.8% being careful with third parties. A surprising high 15.5% 
of them decreases or stops certain online activities as a maladaptive security measure (see table 28). 
This is another indicator of opportunity costs. Just 38.1% of the sample pays for the software they use 
in contrast to 61.7% using free software. A quite high 71% tries to update their software and OS. 
Internet diet 
PEI - Passport 
Demographics 
- Younger (M=43 SD=14.85) 
o More 18-34 (p<.001) 
o Less 65+ (p<.001) & 55-64 
(p<.05) 
- More white collar worker 
o More clerks (p<.001) & civil 
servants (p<.05) 
o Less (semi-)retired (p<.01) 
- Higher education 
o More lowest Bachelor degree 
(p<.001) 
o Less Highest secondary 
degree (p<.01) 
20.0%  
- Top tasks online 
o Information tasks 
o Social tasks 
o Electronic banking 
- more often than the rest (p<.001) 
 
Online perceived safety 
- Doesn’t trust the internet 












Perceived safety of online activity PEI
Totally unsafe Not safe Neutral Safe Very safe
Table 27 PEI: Perceived safety of activity 
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Victimisation rate PEI  
 
Table 29 PEI: Victimisation rate 
63.7% of the PEI’s state that they were never victimised by any of the cybercrimes or don’t know of a 
victimisation event. Furthermore, it is mostly malware (22.60%) and monitoring (14.50%) PEI’s were a 
victim of (see table 29). Moreover, there are more victimized PEI’s from malware (p<.01) than expected 
(𝜒2(8)=19.619, p<.05). Additionally, 
there is a high overrepresentation of 
PEI’s saying they don’t know if they were 
victimized by hacking (p<.001) 
(𝜒2(8)=30.061, p<.001) or monitoring 
























Malware Scams Hacking Monitoring
Victimization rate















Update OS & software
Secure wifi
Use hard to guess passwords
Check sender and content for anomalies
Be carefull with third parties
Decrease or stop internet usage
Decrease or stop certain activities online
There are more PEI’s not knowing if they 
are victimized by hacking & monitoring 
than expected 
Table 28 PEI: Security measures taken 
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4.2.5 Optimistic experienced internet user (OEI) 
Internet diet & perceived safety of online activities  
The OEI’s are just like their pessimistic siblings mainly using 
the internet for traditional tasks like searching information, 
visiting news websites and emailing as more than 75% of 
them do this at least once a day. They are using social 
network sites even more with more than 75% using it every 
day. Electronic banking is done at least once a month by 75%. 
All the other activities are done at least monthly by half of 
the OEI’s. 
The OEI’s perceive activities in general 
as safe (see table 30), comparable with 
the ODI’s (see table 18). More than 
70% of the cluster perceive searching information, visiting news sites, and emailing as “safe” or safer. 
For electronic banking this fraction is still more than 60%. For online gaming, buy & sell goods online, 
Voip, chatting, social media and streaming this fraction is still more than 40%. Only for downloading 
this fraction drops to less than 20%. 
Security measures taken 
4.7% of the OEI’s don’t implement any of the security measures. On average they use 5.35 security 
measures (SD=2.19456). And just as in all other profiles they protect themselves the most against 
malware (M=4.32 SD=2.15783) followed by hacking (M=3.57 SD=2.27805), scams (M=2.7351 
SD=1.98182) and monitoring (M=2.3406 SD= 2.24857). This Security behaviour is very much 
comparable to the pessimistic experienced internet user. There is no significant difference between 
the two groups if you compare the amount of security measures one takes against malware (t(463)= 
1.291,p=.198 ), scams (t(463)= .585,p=.559 ), hacking (t(463)= 1.651,p=.100 ) or monitoring (t(463)= -
.645,p=.519 ). 
There is, however, a difference in which security measures they take, with the OEI’s using significantly 
less maladaptive security measures. They decrease or stops certain activities less often than the 
Internet diet 
OEI - Passport 
Demographics 
- Younger (M=42 SD=15.16) 
o More 18-34 (p<.001) & 35-44 
(p<.05) 
o Less 65+ (p<.001) & 55-64 
(p<.001) 
- More jobless people 
o More students (p<.001) & 
people searching for job 
(p<.05) 
o Less (semi-)retired (p<.01) 
- Higher education 
o More lowest Bachelor degree 
(p<.05) 
- More from Brussels (p<.001) 
- Less from Flanders (p<.05) 
 
17.0%  
- Top tasks online 
o Information tasks 
o Social tasks 
o Electronic banking 
- more often than the rest (p<.001) 
 
Online perceived safety 












Perceived safety of online activity OEI
Totally unsafe Not safe Neutral Safe Very safe
Table 30 OEI: Perceived safety of activity 
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pessimistic experienced internet user (p<.01)( 𝜒2(4)=78.310,p<.001) (see table 31). Just 7.7% of the 
OEI’s decrease or stop certain activities online and just 4.1% of them decrease or stop using the 
internet as a whole.  
With just 32.4%, the OEI’s have the least percentage of people using paid software to secure 
themselves against cybercrime. 
Victimisation rate OEI  
 
Table 32 OEI: Victimisation rate 
Also in this cluster malware is the biggest threat (18.50%) followed by monitoring (12.40%), hacking 
(9.40%) and scams (9.00%). 
In the cluster of OEI’s, there is no over- or underrepresentation for the victimisation of any cybercrime 
except for monitoring where there is an overrepresentation of people not being victimized by 























Malware Scams Hacking Monitoring
Victimization rate















Update OS & software
Secure wifi
Use hard to guess passwords
Check sender and content for anomalies
Be carefull with third parties
Decrease or stop internet usage
Decrease or stop certain activities online
Table 31 OEI: Security measures taken 
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4.2.6 Typologies, mutual comparison 
Our typologies are per definition different in terms of internet usage, perceived security of the internet 
and security measures taken. It is however interesting to also compare these clusters in terms of 
victimisation rates and costs. Therefore in the following chapter, this comparison is done in addition 
to their defining variables. 
Online activities 
If we look at the online activities every cluster takes part in, we can clearly see a distinction between 
people using the internet mostly for traditional tasks such as retrieving information, sending emails or 
visiting news sites and people using the internet for more advanced tasks such as chatting, 
downloading and streaming. 
If you look at the devices one uses to do these activities and the activities they perform, we can 
differentiate three distinct groups in the five clusters.  
The ODI’s and PDI’s are generally having the same internet diet. They are mutually not significantly 
different on any of the measures of 
the activities. They score higher on 
every activity than the IUI’s but lower 
than the PEI’s and OEI’s. Therefore we 
call the ODI’s and PDI’s intermediate 
internet users. 
The PEI’s and OEI’s also have the same internet diet. They are scoring the highest on every single online 
activity but don’t differ significantly from one another. We call these two clusters advanced internet 
users. 
As a third group, we have the IUI’s who uses the internet in a significantly different way than the other 
two groups of clusters. They score lowest on every online activity. We call this cluster the novice 
internet users. 
 
Table 33 Comparison of knowledge of online activities 








Comparison in knowledge of an online activity: "I don't know 
this activity"
IUI ODI PDI PEI OEI
The IUI’s know by far the least online 
activities 
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Security measures 
We compared the security measures of the different clusters in terms of the amount of security 
measures but also in terms of which kinds of security measures a cluster uses. 
Amount of security measures 
If we look at the amount of security measures a cluster takes against certain cybercrimes we can 
conclude that the different cluster differ significantly from one another in the amount of security 
measures one takes against malware (F(4)=145.832, p<.001), scams(F(4)=303.377, p<.001), 
hacking(F(4)=245.260, p<.001), monitoring(F(4)=261.181, p<.001) and all of the cybercrimes combined 
(F(4)=83.794, p<.001).  
 
 
Table 34 Amount of security measure by cluster 
Just as with their internet diet, the PEI’s and the OEI’s are taking approximately the same amount of 
security measures. There is no significant difference between the two for any of the cybercrimes 
(malware; p=.774, scams; p=.983, hacking; p=.460, monitoring; p=.977, all of them combined; p=.905). 
Compared to the other clusters they take significantly fewer security measures than the ODI’s and the 
PDI’s but significantly more than the IUI’s.  
All the other cluster differ significantly from 
one another in the amount of security 
measures they take against any cybercrime 
(p<.01 on every occasion). The PDI’s 
implements generally the most security 
measures, followed by the ODI’s. The cluster that takes the least security measures is the IUI’s. This is 
true across all the cybercrimes. 
Types of security measures 
If we compare the different types of security measures a cluster takes, we see that the clusters are 
significantly different for technical adaptive security measures (F(4)=66.500, p<.001), social adaptive 





















































































Malware Scams Hacking Monitoring All cybercrimes
Amount of security measures taken against cybercrime
Mean Std. Deviation
ODI PDI IUI PEI OCEI Total ODI PDI IUI PEI OCEI Total ODI PDI IUI PEI OCEI Total ODI PDI IUI PEI OCEI Total ODI PDI IUI PEI OCEI
Mean 6,0 7,0 3,4 4,6 4,3 5,0 5,0 6,2 1,7 2,8 2,7 3,6 5,8 6,8 2,2 3,9 3,6 4,4 4,3 5,8 1,0 2,2 2,3 3,1 6,4 7,1 4,3 5,5 5,3
Malware Scams Hacking Monitoring All cybercrimes
The IUI’s take the least security 
measures 
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Table 35 Security measures by type by cluster 
We can again make three groups, the ODI’s and PDI’s don’t differ significantly in the technical (p=.061) 
and social adaptive security measures (p=.993). The PEI’s and OEI’s are also one group as they also 
don’t differ significantly in the technical (p=1.000) and social adaptive security measures (p=.829).  
The defensive internet users use most adaptive security measures, followed by the experienced 
internet users. The IUI’s applies least technical and social adaptive security measures and does this 
significantly less than the others (p<.001 for both).  
It is however interesting to look at the 
maladaptive internet users where only the 
PDI’s differ significantly (p<.001) from the 
others, they apply the most maladaptive 
security measures. This could mean that the 
PDI’s are trying to defend their self but don’t really know how to. Therefore they just implement 












ODI PDI IUI PEI OEI Total ODI PDI IUI PEI OEI Total ODI PDI IUI PEI OEI Total
Technical adaptive security measures Social adaptive security measures Maladaptive security measures
Standardized amount of security measures by type 
Mean Std. Deviation
The PDI’s take most maladaptive 
security measures 
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Multiple uses of security measures 
 
Table 36 Amount of cybercrimes one seeks protection for by cluster 
If we look at the amount of crimes a certain security measure is used against we can see that if people 
used maladaptive security measures (such as decreasing or stopping internet usage or decreasing or 
stopping certain activities online) they do this to counter most cybercrimes. 
Furthermore we see that there is a difference between the clusters for every security measure (free 
software (F(4)=53.376, p<.001), paying software (F(4)=34.689, p<.001), included software (F(4)= 
29.228, p<.001), Update OS & software (F(4)=36.584, p<.001), Secure Wi-Fi (F(4)=32.449, p<.001), Hard 
password (F(4)=34.540, p<.001), check sender (F(4)=34.852, p<.001), be careful with third parties 
(F(4)=43.805, p<.001), decrease or stop internet (F(4)=37.348, p<.001) and decrease or stop activity 
(F(4)=34.507, p<.001)) .  
There are two bigger groups to be 
distinguished. On one hand, we have the 
ODI’s and PDI’s who generally use every 
security measure (if they implement it) 
against most threats. And on the other hand, 
we have the IUI’s, PEI’s and OEI’s who use every security measure (if they implement it) against fewer 
threats. The difference between these two groups are significant (p<.001 on every occasion), within 
the groups there is no significant difference. This measure can indicate how much a certain group trusts 
a security measure to protect themselves, for the optimistic and pessimistic defensive internet user 
this trust is thus higher.  
Victimisation rate 
The victimisation rate between the different clusters differs significantly for malware (𝜒2(8)=19.619, 
p<.05), hacking (𝜒2(8)=30.061, p<.001) and monitoring (𝜒2(8)=47.766, p<.001). For scams, this is 



















ODI PDI IUI PEI OEI General
Against how many cybercrimes is a security measure used?
Free software Paying software
Included software Update OS & software
Secure wifi Use hard to guess passwords
Check sender and content for anomalies Be carefull with third parties
Decrease or stop internet usage Decrease or stop certain activities online
The ODI’s and PDI’s implement each 
security measures against most threats 
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Table 37 Victimisation rate by cluster 
Here we can see that significantly less (p<.01) ODI’s and significantly more PEI’s (p<.01) are victimized 
by malware than expected. 
There are significantly more PDI’s that are victimized by hacking (p<.01) and significantly less IUI’s that 
are victimized by hacking (p<.01) than expected. Interestingly there are significantly more PEI’s (p<.01) 
and more IUI’s (p<.05) that state they don’t know if they have been hacked than expected. 
For monitoring, there is also a significant overrepresentation of the PDI’s that state they were 
victimized by monitoring (p<.05) and a significant underrepresentation for IUI’s stating they were 
victimized by monitoring (p<.05). 
Furthermore, there is a very significant overrepresentation of PEI’s that don’t know if they are 
victimized by monitoring (p<.001) and an underrepresentation of the ODI’s that don’t know if they are 
victimized by monitoring (p<.001). 
We can thus conclude that in general the 
PDI’s are despite their defensive character 
being victimized the most. Also, the PEI’s are 
being victimized more often than expected 
especially by malware. The ODI’s are being 
victimized the least, especially by malware. 
Surprisingly the IUI’s are less than expected victim of monitoring or hacking. This could be because 
they don’t notice if they are victimized or that they don’t or to a lesser extent than the rest do the 
activities online in which one could get hacked, such as using social network sites. 
Security measures combined with victimisation rate 
Looking at the security measures and the victimisation rate it is interesting to notice that the amount 












Yes No I don't
know
Yes No I don't
know
Yes No I don't
know
Yes No I don't
know
Malware Scams Hacking Monitoring
Victimization rate 
ODI PDI IUI PEI OEI Total
PDI’s are despite their defensive 
character being victimized the most 
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implementing the most security measures against scams, hacking or monitoring also being victimized 
the most by these cybercrimes. PDI’s, however, also implement most maladaptive security measures, 
which do not protect them against cybercrime.  
The IUI’s are despite implementing by far the least security measures against the different cybercrimes 
not most victimized, they are even least victimized for monitoring and hacking. 
Also, experience is not the differentiating variable to whether or not being victimized by cybercrime. 
The PEI’s are being victimized by malware most of all clusters. The OEI’s, however, are much less 
victimized than its pessimistic cousin.  
Cybercrime cost 
Direct costs 
For this data, only the victimized people are taken into account. As these are just a small fraction of 
the population (see table 38), the conclusions in this section are solely of exploratory nature. 
Amount of … Malware 
victims 
Scams victims Hacking victims Monitoring 
victims 
ODI 19 10.27% 7 3.78% 18 9.73% 18 9.73% 
PDI 52 17.63% 31 10.51% 38 12.88% 50 16.95% 
IUI 49 15.65% 18 5.75% 18 5.75% 30 9.58% 
PEI 57 22.62% 16 6.35% 26 10.32% 37 14.68% 
OEI 39 18.31% 20 9.39% 19 8.92% 26 12.21% 
Table 38 Amount of victims by cybercrime by cluster 
Direct monetary costs 
 
Table 39 Direct monetary cost by crime by cluster 
More than 80 % of the ODI victims paid no direct costs for any of the cybercrimes (see table 39). This 
is also true for the PDI victims, IUI victims and PEI victims for all cybercrimes but scams. Moreover, 
scams are in general most expensive for all clusters but ODI victims. For all cybercrimes except for 
scams the OEI victims suffer the highest direct monetary costs. For scams this is the IUI victims, a 












ODI PDI IUI PEI OEI ODI PDI IUI PEI OEI ODI PDI IUI PEI OEI ODI PDI IUI PEI OEI
Malware Scam Hacking Monitoring
Direct monetary costs by cybercrime
payed anything payed more than €100 Victimization rate
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Interestingly, however, is that the 
victimisation rate is not linked to the amount 
of people stating that they suffered direct 
costs (see table 39). So even if they are 
victimized less often this does not mean they 
have less direct monetary costs for when 
they are victimized. 
For a detailed overview tables of all direct monetary costs per cybercrime per cluster see Appendix E 
Direct non-monetary costs 
As there are no 30 people in every cluster for every cybercrime the central limit theorem couldn’t be 
applied. The remaining respondents are also not normally distributed. A Kruskal-Wallis test show that 
there is no significant difference between the clusters for the sumscale of harm experienced by 
malware(H(4)=2.260, p=.688), scams(H(4)=4.357, p=.360), hacking(H(4)=1.491, p=.828) or 
monitoring(H(4)=7.219, p=.125).  
 
Table 40 Mean direct non-monetary cost by crime by cluster 
With ‘3’ being moderately harmful we see that no matter the crime all crimes are seen on average 
about moderately harmful.  
If we then look at the direct non-monetary direct costs in more detail. We see that after more Kruskal-
wallis tests for every cybercrime for daily activities (malware H(4)=.819, p=.936; scams H(4)=1.948, 
p=.745; hacking H(4)=1.331, p=.856; monitoring H(4)=4.530, p=.339), reputation (malware 
H(4)=.1.805, p=.772; scams H(4)=5.024, p=.285; hacking H(4)=1.295, p=.862; monitoring H(4)=4.996, 
p=.288) and privacy (malware H(4)=3.547, p=.471; scams H(4)=3.771, p=.438; hacking H(4)=.980, 
p=.913; monitoring H(4)=8.760, p=.067) there is no significant difference to be found between the 
different clusters. For a general overview of the non-monetary direct costs see table 16. 
Opportunity costs 
Opportunity costs are measures with direct questions, the maladaptive security measures and the 









Harm malware Harm scams Harm hacking Harm monitoring Mean of clusters
Mean direct non-monetary costs
ODI PDI IUI PEI OEI Mean of cybercrime
65% of the IUI’s state they paid money 
as a direct consequence of scams 
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Opportunity costs (direct questions) 
If we look at these opportunity costs in detail we see that 10.7% of the PDI’s say they agree or totally 
agree with the statement they reduce their electronic banking because of cybercrime. This is by far the 
most with just 3.9% for the OEI’s, 5.8% for the IUI’s, 8.4% for the PEI’s and 2.3% for the OEI’s. For online 
shopping again 13.6% of the PDI’s agree or totally agree, for IUI this is an equally high 13.9%. The rest 
scores with 6.2% (OEI’s), 4.1% (PEI’s) and 4% (OEI’s) considerably lower. An even higher 16.6% of the 
PDI’s agree or totally agree for social networks. This is again much higher than all the other clusters 
(IUI’s= 7.5%, ODI’s=3.6%, PEI’s=9.5% and OEI’s= 2.4%). If we base ourselves on these findings we can 
claim that the PDI’s and to some extent the IUI’s experience the most opportunity costs. This is still 
true if we analyse the sumscale (α=.832). 
The different clusters differ significantly 
from each other in terms of opportunity 
costs if we look at the sumscale of the three 
questions (F(4)=15.051, p<.001) 
The PDI’s (M=2.1402 SD=.92510) and the IUI’s (M=2.1092 SD=.86670) score highest and don’t differ 
significantly from one another (p=.997). 
Then you have the PEI’s (M=1.8596 SD=.78160) and the OEI’s (M=1.7933 SD=.77354) who don’t differ 
significantly from one another (p=.970). 
The ODI’s don’t differ significantly from the OEI (M=1.5930 SD=.72006) either (p=.319). 
If we look at the different means of the clusters we can, however, determine that in general the 
perceived opportunity costs on electronic banking, social network sites and buying and selling goods 
online is not high. The average response is lower than neutral (3) in the statements about opportunity 
costs. There is, however, a significant fraction for which these opportunity costs are considerable, 
especially for the PDI’s with 22.3% of them scoring more than neutral (3) and 18.2% of the IUI’s scoring 
more than neutral (3) for the sumscale of the direct questions on opportunity costs. 
Maladaptive security measures 
The PDI’s implement by far the most maladaptive security measures with 26.26% reducing or stopping 
internet usage or a specific online activity as security measures (cfr. supra). All the other clusters don’t 
differ significantly from another. This does however not mean they do not implement maladaptive 
security measures with on average 10.7% of the ODI’s, 9.32% of the IUI’s, 10.33% of the PEI’s and 5.9% 
of the OEI’s reducing or stopping internet usage in general or a specific online activity as security 
measure (for more detailed information about these security measures see table 19, 22, 25, 28 & 31). 
Correlation between perceived security and frequency of an online activity 
For all clusters but for the OEI’s, there are more than six significant correlations to be found that 
indicate that the more someone perceives an activity as safe, the more they will perform that activity 
(see table 41). Surprising these correlations are higher for activities that are not or to a lesser extent 
done by the cluster. These correlations are quite high and numerous for all but the OEI’s. 
 
 
Table 41 Correlations between perceived safety and frequency of use of online activities per cluster 
The PDI’s and IUI’s experience the 
highest opportunity costs 
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If we look at the average correlation of these items we see that these are much higher for the ODI’s 
than for the rest (see table 42). 
  
Table 42 Average correlation between frequency and perceived security of an online activity by cluster 
It is important to note that the six significant correlations that were found with the optimistic defensive 
internet users are to be found in all the other cluster (except for the optimistic experienced internet 
user). These activities are: 
- Online gaming 
- Using social network sites 
- Chatting 
- Calling over the internet 
- Buying and selling goods online  
- Streaming 

















ODI PDI IUI PEI OEI
Average correlation between perceived safety 
and frequency of online activity


















ODI r -.026 .036 .054 .049 .448** .228** .356** .409** .295** .119 .332** 
p .725 .628 .468 .508 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 .139 <.001 
PDI r .07 .158** .082 .144* .347** .303** .376** .297** .265** .069 .332** 
p .235 <.01 .164 .014 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 .273 <.001 
IUI r .095 .140* .169** .211* .323** .265** .174** .301** .317** .097 .272** 
p .098 <.05 .<.01 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 .149 <.001 
PEI r .163** .150* .09 .049 .327** .288** .263** .219** .158* .115 .294** 
p <.01 <.05 .155 .446 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.05 .083 <.001 
OEI r .058 .027 -.132 .008 .14 .103 .271** .135 -.009 -.067 .150* 
p .397 .695 .053 .907 .061 .139 <.01 .071 .899 .354 .035 
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Conclusion 
Four of the five cluster experience in one 
way or another opportunity costs 
because of cybercrime. This is visible in 
the direct questions about opportunity 
costs, the maladaptive security measures 
they take but also in the correlation between the perceived security of an activity and the frequency 
of doing a certain activity online. 
For every measure of opportunity costs the OEI’s show that they perceive the least opportunity costs 
of all the clusters.  
Defence costs 
There is no normal distribution as there are less than 30 respondents who answered the defence cost 
with not “€0” in for at least one cluster in every cybercrime. The remaining respondents are not 
normally distributed either, therefore we performed a Mann-Whitney. 
This test shows us that none of the defence 
costs against any type of cybercrime differs 
significantly between the clusters. This is 
true for defence costs against malware 
(H(4)=6.199 p=.185), scams (H(4)=6.200 
p=.185), hacking (H(4)=4.882 p=.300) and 
monitoring (H(4)=1.903 p=.754). 
For cybercrime in general, however, we can apply the central limit theorem as all of the clusters have 
at least 30 respondents that answered something else than €0. After a one-way Anova analysis, 
however, also here there is no significant difference between the clusters (F(4)=1.544 p=.190). 
For the general information about the defence costs on the whole sample see table 17. 
Awareness of cybercrime and security measures 
A one-way Anova shows us that there is a significant difference between the clusters in terms of the 
sumscale (α=.839) of awareness of the cybercrimes (F(4)=88.218 p<.001) and the sumscale (α=.882) of 
the awareness of the security measures (F(4)=69.130 p<.001). A post-hoc Sheffe test shows us that the 
IUI’s score significantly (p<.001) lower (M=2.9104 SD=1.06673) on the awareness of cybercrimes than 
the ODI’s (M=3.4013 SD=.92579), PDI’s (M=3.5568 SD=.84757), PEI’s (M=3.5256 SD=.94314) or the 
OEI’s (M=3.3629 SD=.97473). Furthermore, the IUI (M=3.1338 SD=.79863) also score significantly 
lower on the awareness of security 
measures (p<.001) than the ODI’s 
(M=3.7435 SD=.63426), PDI’s (M=3.7122 
SD=.70187), PEI’s (M=3.4688 SD=.75300) or 
the OEI’s (M=3.5077 SD=.65728). These 
results lend to support that the IUI is not 
really victimized less but is unaware if they 
are victimized. 
 
All but the OEI’s experience opportunity 
costs to some extent 
There is no significant difference in 
terms of defence costs in between 
clusters 
The IUI was by far least aware of the 
different cybercrimes and security 
measures 
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Conclusion typologies, mutual comparison  
Using a cluster analysis we differentiated between five typologies. The optimistic defensive internet 
users (ODI), the pessimistic defensive internet users (PDI), the inexperienced unknowing internet users 
(IUI), the pessimistic experienced internet users (PEI) and the optimistic experienced internet users 
(OEI).  
The IUI’s have a low frequency of internet use and mainly engage in traditional online activities, they 
are seen as the novice internet users. ODI’s and the PDIs can be considered the intermediate Internet 
users. They use the Internet more often than the novice users but less often than the advanced 
internet users. They use the internet for mainly the same activities as the IUI’s. The PEI’s and the OEI’s 
are the biggest and most advanced internet users.  
Taking into account the security measures of the groups we notice that the advanced internet users (= 
PEI’s & OEI’s) implement a similar amount of security measures. The intermediate internet users 
(=ODI’s & PDI’s), however, do not. They are significantly different from one another when it comes to 
maladaptive security measures, with the PDI’s implementing significantly more maladaptive security 
measures than the ODI’s.  
The PDI’s implement significantly more 
maladaptive security measures than all the 
other typologies. This could mean that 
they are not able to protect themselves in 
a good way. The ODI’s and PDI’s, however, 
don’t differ significantly on their adaptive 
security behaviour. They implement in general more security measures than the advanced internet 
users, who in their turn implement more security measures than the IUI’s.  
The victimisation rates are higher than expected for the PEI’s for malware. The IUI’s are victimized less 
than expected by hacking or monitoring. This could be explained by their lack of awareness of 
cyberthreats and security measures. The ODI’s are also victimized less than expected for all 
cybercrimes but scams. For the PDI’s, the 
victimisation rate is higher than expected 
for hacking and monitoring. For scams, 
they also have the highest victimisation 
rate although not significantly more than 
expected. This adds to the presumption 
that they are not able to adequately protect themselves.  
In general, monitoring is seen as the least 
expensive cybercrime and scams as the 
most expensive cybercrime. The IUI’s are 
paying the most money as a consequence 
of scams. Interestingly, the victimisation 
rate is not linked to the amount someone 
pays as a direct consequence of a cybercrime. 
Opportunity costs are felt by every cluster but the OEI’s. We can conclude that the PDI’s & IUI’s are 
experiencing the most opportunity costs. The PDI’s implements most maladaptive security measures 
and scores together with the IUI’s the highest on the direct opportunity questions.  
The PDI’s implement significantly more 
maladaptive security measures than all 
the rest 
The IUI lack awareness to notice if they 
are victimized 
The IUI are paying most money as a 
consequence of scams 
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As for non-monetary direct costs or defence costs, there is no significant difference between the 
clusters.  
The ODI’s are also experiencing opportunity 
costs as they have the highest average 
correlation between the perceived security 
and the frequency of use of a certain online 
activity. The PEI’s also experience 
opportunity costs but to a lesser extent. 
If we look at the victimisation rate and combine this with the security measures we can conclude that 
there are two clusters that are of special interest for risk communication. First, we argue that the IUI’s 
are an important cluster for risk communication because they lack awareness and are not fully able to 
know if they are victimized or not. They are not protecting themselves against cybercrime when 
compared to more experienced internet users, and are still experiencing the highest direct costs from 
scams.  
The PDI is implementing all security 
measures it can, maladaptive or adaptive 
and has a general distrust on the Internet. 
Just like the IUI, this cluster stays an 
important cluster for risk communication 
because they are not fully able to effectively 
and adequately protect themselves against cybercrime. In addition, they also suffer many opportunity 
costs when trying to protect themselves. 
 
4.3 Population evolution 2015 - 2017 
4.3.1 Trust & perceived security 
Comparing the trust levels of the internet 
between 2015 and 2017 we find a 
significant yet small difference where 
people nowadays (M=2.60 SD=.7605) are 
less concerned about the internet in 
general than in 2015 (M=2.73 SD=.2219) (t(2418)=-4.318, p<.001). 
No difference was found in the perceived safety of online activities between 2015 and 2017 for 
information retrieval (p=.151), visiting news sites (p=.965), sending emails (p=.165), visiting social 
media (p=.627), using VOIP (p=.179), selling or buying things online (p=.967) or downloading (p=.225). 
There is, however, a significant difference for online banking (p<.01) and chatting (p<.05). In the second 
wave, people seem to have higher levels 
of trust for these activities. The opposite 
was found for online gaming (p<.01) and 
streaming (p<.01). In 2015 people put 
more trust into the latter activities.  
4.3.2 Victimisation rate 
In 2015 40.4% were victimized by malware, in 2017 this is significantly less with 17.3% (p<.001). For 
monitoring, similar results were found, in 2015 24.8% and in 2017 12.9% of the people were victimized 
Opportunity costs are felt by all clusters 
but the OEI’s 
The PDI’s and the IUI’s are important 
clusters for risk communication 
In 2015 streaming and online gaming 
was considered safer than in 2017 
In 2017 online banking and chatting is 
considered safer than in 2015 
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by monitoring (p<.001). For scams and hacking, no significant differences were found between 2015 
and 2017. 
4.3.3 Security measures4 
On average significantly more technical 
adaptive security measures were employed 
in 2017: 63.5% of the offered technical 
adaptive security measures were used in 
2017 as opposed to only 43.6% in 2015 
(p<.001).  
For maladaptive security measures, the opposite is true. In 2015 66.9% of the people implemented at 
least one maladaptive security measure compared to only 19.2% in 2017. 
4.3.4 Direct monetary cost 
There is a significant difference between 2015 and 2017 for the direct costs of malware (U=45708.000, 
p<.001), scams (U=4109.500, p<.05), hacking (U=5036.500, p<.001) and monitoring (U=11654.500, 






















€0 174 49,7% 16,8% 162 81,5% 12,9% 
<€20 36 10,3% 3,5% 9 4,7% 0,7% 
€21-
€200 
115 32,9% 11,1% 21 10,7% 1,7% 
€201-
€2001 
17 4,9% 1,7% 3 1,5% 0,2% 
€2000+ 8 2,3% 0,8% 3 1,5% 0,2% 





















€0 18 30,0% 1,7% 48 53,7% 3,8% 
<€20 11 18,3% 1,1% 2 2,1% 0,1% 
€21-
€200 14 23,3% 1,4% 23 25,2% 1,8% 
€201-
€2001 10 16,7% 1,0% 10 11,0% 0,8% 
€2000+ 7 11,7% 0,7% 7 7,9% 0,6% 
Table 44 Comparison 2015/2017 direct monetary costs scams 
                                                          
4 Not all analysis could be replicated with the data from 2015 as there were differences in the survey’s. Social 
adaptive security measures were not included in the 2015 survey. 
In 2017 significantly more adaptive and 
less maladaptive security measures 
were implemented than in 2015 
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€0 31 48,4% 3,0% 93 84,0% 7,4% 
<€20 5 7,8% 0,5% 7 5,9% 0,5% 
€21-
€200 15 23,4% 1,5% 6 5,6% 0,5% 
€201-
€2001 6 9,4% 0,6% 4 3,6% 0,3% 
€2000+ 7 10,9% 0,7% 1 0,9% 0,1% 
Table 45 Comparison 2015/2017 direct monetary costs hacking 
Table 46 Comparison 2015/2017 direct monetary costs monitoring 
 Malware Scams Hacking Monitoring 
Median 
2015 
1.5 3 2 1 
Median 
2017 
1 1 1 1 
Table 47 Comparison 2015/2017 median of direct monetary cost by cybercrime 1=€0, 2=<€20, 3=<€200 
4.3.5 Conclusion how has the population evolved between 2015 and 2017 
People in 2015 trusted the internet significantly less than in 2017. The reduced victimisation rate of 
malware and monitoring combined with the increase of technical adaptive security measures makes 
us believe that people in 2017 are better armed against those cybercrimes. The victimization rate of 
scams and hacking, however, has not 
changed significantly, despite the 
increasing implementation of technical 
adaptive security measures.  
That said, the direct monetary costs have declined when we compare the direct monetary costs 
between 2015 and 2017. A plausible explanation may be that the concept of cost was differently 
operationalized in 2015 than in 2017. In 2015 cost was operationalised by only one single question 






















 €0 119 79,9% 11,5% 131 91,0% 10,4% 
<€20 9 6,0% 0,9% 3 0,2% 0,2% 
€21-
€200 12 8,1% 1,2% 7 0,5% 0,5% 
€201-
€2001 5 3,4% 0,5% 1 0,1% 0,1% 
€2000+ 4 2,7% 0,4% 2 0,2% 0,2% 
In 2017 significantly less people were 
victimized by malware and monitoring 
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4.4 Typology evolution 2015 - 2017 (RQ2.2) 
The cluster analysis differentiated between 4 typologies in 2015 and 5 typologies in 2017. Although 
the groups are inherently different, to some extent, they do have similarities which allow us to 
compare the data between 2015 and 2017. For example, the inexperienced internet user (2015) is 
comparable to the inexperienced unknowing internet user (2017) (see table 48). 
2015 2017 
The conscious internet users (32.0%)  The pessimistic experienced internet users 
(20.0%) 
  The optimistic experienced internet users 
(17.0%) 
The inexperienced internet users (35.3%)  The inexperienced unknowing internet 
users (24.9%) 
The resolved internet users (19.1%)  The pessimistic defensive internet users 
(23.4%) 
  The optimistic defensive internet users 
(14.7%) 
The overly confident internet users (13.5%)  All clusters but the IUI’s 
Table 48 Typology 2015/2017 
4.4.1 General  
Comparing the data between 2015 and 2017 we see that the inexperienced internet users are 
comparable to the inexperienced unknowing internet users. They are using the internet least often 
and for traditional purposes. Furthermore, they barely use security measures to protect themselves. 
This group is reduced from 35.3% to 24.9% in between 2015 and 2017. 
The conscious internet user of 2015 is comparable to the pessimistic and optimistic experienced 
internet users of 2017. They are the internet users who use the internet most often, with most devices 
and with the highest variety. In general, these groups are younger and they implement quite a lot of 
security measures to protect themselves. The conscious internet users of 2015 had doubts about the 
safety of the internet which they perceive as not entirely safe. In 2017 this is divided between the PEI’s 
who also doubt the safety of the internet and the OEI’s who don’t. The conscious internet users were 
in 2015 the second biggest group with 32.0%. The pessimistic (20.0%) and optimistic experienced 
internet users (17.0%) together account for about the same fraction with 37.0%.  
The resolved internet users of 2015 show similarities to the 2017 defensive internet users, both the 
optimistic and pessimistic defensive internet users. The resolved internet user and the defensive 
internet users both implement a lot of security measures and have a moderate variety and frequency 
of internet use. The perceived safety of the internet is in 2017 (just like with the conscious internet 
users) divided between the pessimistic and optimistic defensive internet user. In 2015 the resolved 
internet users consisted of 19.1% of the sample, in 2017 this is much more with a combined 38.1% 
(PDI’s = 23.4%, ODI’s= 14.7%). 
The overly confident internet user, however, is not that easily traceable. If we look at their internet 
use, we can compare them with the defensive internet users (both the optimistic and pessimistic). If 
we look at their perceived safety of the internet, we see they compare well to the optimistic defensive 
internet user or the optimistic experienced internet user. This comparison doesn’t hold up when 
looking at the security measures taken. The amount of security measures the overly confident internet 
user takes can be compared to the optimistic or pessimistic experienced internet users’ amount of 
security measures. This, however, doesn’t hold true for the amount of cybercrimes they protect 
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themselves against or for the older demographics of the overly confident internet user. It seems fair 
to say that the overly confident user has bits of every cluster but the inexperienced unknowing internet 
user in 20175. Their 13.5% is thus divided over all the groups in 2017. 
4.4.2 Security measures 
Inexperienced internet user °2015 – Inexperienced unknowing internet user °2017 
If we compare the inexperienced internet user between 2015 and 2017 we can see that in 2015 more 
maladaptive security measures were performed, with 32.6% reducing their internet activities and 
57.6% reducing various activities online. In 2017, however, such counterproductive measures are less 
implemented, with only 7.4% decreasing or stopping internet usage and 11.3% decreasing or stopping 
a certain activity online . 
Considering the adaptive security measures, the inexperienced unknowing internet user is scoring the 
lowest of all clusters of 2017(cfr. supra). In 2015 they implemented second to least adaptive security 
measures across the line (with the overly confident internet user implementing even fewer security 
measures). The inexperienced internet user has thus certainly not changed their adaptive security 
behaviour for the better. 
Conscious internet user °2015 – Pessimistic/optimistic experienced internet user °2017 
Looking at the maladaptive security measures of the pessimistic and optimistic experienced internet 
users in 2017, they rarely implement maladaptive security measures. This is in contrast to the 
conscious internet users in 2015, who scored much higher than the resolved internet users on the two 
maladaptive security measures; with 20.5% of them reducing their internet usage and 66.2% reducing 
certain activities online. 
For the adaptive security measures, however, the conscious internet user also scored higher than the 
rest in 2015 with. They had “by far most security measures in place”, thus Verdegem et al. (2015). In 
2017 they are generally second in rank, but still implement quite a lot of adaptive security measures 
when looking at the different groups of clusters (cfr. supra). 
The PEI’s and OEI’s in 2017 have thus changed their security behaviour with less maladaptive but also 
less technological security measures compared to 2015. 
Resolved internet user °2015 – Pessimistic/optimistic defensive internet user °2017 
11.1% of the resolved internet user reduced or stopped their internet usage as a security measure, 
32.9% of them reduced or stopped a certain activity online. Doing so they implemented an average 
amount of maladaptive security measures compared to the other clusters of 2015. In 2017 the 
pessimistic and optimistic defensive internet user differ significantly on maladaptive security 
measures. The pessimistic defensive internet user implements by far the most maladaptive security 
measures (19.9% reducing or stopping internet usage, 32.7% reducing or stopping certain activities 
online) while the optimistic defensive internet user doesn’t differ differently from the rest. They 
implement less maladaptive security measures than the pessimistic defensive internet users (10.2% 
reducing or stopping internet usage, 11.4% reducing or stopping certain activities online). 
If we look at the adaptive security measures, the resolved internet users in 2015 are scoring average 
in percentage but are having 97.6% of them paying for software to protect against cybercrime. In 2017 
                                                          
5 Because there is no clear comparable cluster found in 2017 for the overly confident internet user, there is no 
comparing analysis done. 
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the pessimistic and optimistic defensive internet users can be seen as a group and are implementing 
the most adaptive security measures of all clusters.  
The PDI’s are implementing more maladaptive and more technological adaptive security measures 
relative to the other clusters in 2017 compared to 2015. The ODI’s however only implement more 
technological adaptive security measures 
4.4.3 Victimisation rate 
Inexperienced internet user °2015 – Inexperienced unknowing internet user °2017 
If we compare the victimisation rate of the inexperienced internet users in 2015 and 2017 we can see 
a significant difference in self-reported victimisation rate, with the inexperienced internet users in 
2015 having a higher victimisation rate than those of 2017 in all cybercrimes but hacking (see table 
49). 





difference 2015 & 
2017 
 Inexperienced internet 
user 
IUI’s  
Malware 38.3% 15.5% <.001 
Scams 10.4% 5.9% <.05 
Hacking 7.8% 5.9% NS 
Monitoring 20.6% 9.5% <.001 
Table 49 comparison 2015/2017 Inexperienced internet user: Victimisation rate 
Conscious internet user °2015 – Pessimistic/optimistic experienced internet user °2017 
We can see that the victimisation rate for the conscious internet user in 2015 is significantly higher for 
malware and monitoring than in 2017. This is true for the optimistic experienced internet user as well 
as the pessimistic experienced internet user. There is, however, no significant difference found for the 






between 2015 & 2017 
 Conscious internet 
user 
OEI’s PEI’s OEI’s PEI’s 
Malware 39.6% 18.5% 22.6% <.001 <.001 
Scams 10.7% 9.4% 6.3% NS NS 
Hacking 13.0% 9.0% 10.4% NS NS 
Monitoring 30.1% 12.4% 14.5% <.001 <.001 
Table 50 Comparison 2015/2017 conscious internet user/experienced internet users: Victimisation rate 
Resolved internet user °2015 – Pessimistic/optimistic defensive internet user °2017 
We can see that the victimisation rate for the resolved internet user in 2015 is significantly higher for 
malware and monitoring than for the optimistic and pessimistic defensive internet users in 2017. There 
is, however, just like with the OEI’s and PEI’s no significant difference found for the victimisation of 






between 2015 & 2017 
 Resolved internet user ODI’s PDI’s ODI’s PDI’s 
Malware 45.4% 10.3% 17.6% <.001 <.001 
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Scams 8.7% 4.0% 10.4% NS NS 
Hacking 14.0% 9.9% 12.9% NS NS 
Monitoring 26.6% 10.0% 17.1% <.001 <.05 
Table 51 Comparison 2015/2017 resolved internet user/defensive internet users: Victimisation rate  
4.4.4 Cybercrime cost 
The only cost that is measured in 2015 is the direct monetary cost. Only the victims of a certain 
cybercrime received the questions about their direct monetary costs after they stated they were 
victimized. Generally, we can conclude that in 2015 more direct costs were experienced than in 2017 
(cfr. Supra). This is also true for every comparable cluster-groups.  
Inexperienced internet user °2015 – Inexperienced unknowing internet user °2017 
If we compare the inexperienced profiles from 2015 and 2017, we can see for the inexperienced 
unknowing victims in 2017 more than 80% paid no direct costs for malware, hacking or monitoring 
whatsoever. For scams, this is not the case with more than 50% of the victims paying “between €20 
and €200” or more.  
In 2015, however, a direct cost “between €0 and €20” was experienced by more than 75% of the 
victimized inexperienced internet users for malware, scams, hacking and monitoring. More than 50% 
of the victims of scams and malware paid “between €20 and €200” or more. 
Conscious internet user °2015 – Pessimistic/optimistic experienced internet user °2017 
The conscious internet users who were victimized in 2015 also paid more than the 2017 optimistic and 
pessimistic experienced internet user.  
In 2017  more than 60% of the victimized optimistic experienced user paid no money as a direct cost 
for any cybercrime. 80% of the victimized pessimistic experienced internet user paid no money as a 
direct cost for malware, hacking or monitoring, for scams, more than 50% of the PEI’s paid “between 
€20 and €200” or more.  
In 2015, the victimized conscious internet users, however, paid much more with more than 50% paying 
“between €200 and €2000” or more as a direct cost caused by scams. For the other crimes, 75% of 
them paid between “€0 and  €20” or more. 
Resolved internet user °2015 – Pessimistic/optimistic defensive internet user °2017 
The same story is true when comparing the victimized resolved internet user of 2015 and the victimized 
pessimistic and optimistic defensive internet user of 2017.  
In 2017, more than 80% of the victimized optimistic defensive internet user paid no money as a direct 
cost caused by any crime. More than 80% of the pessimistic defensive internet user didn’t pay any 
money as a direct cost for any cybercrimes but scams, for scams more than 25% of them paid “between 
€20 and €200” or more. 
In 2015, more than 75% of the victimized resolved internet user paid “between €0 and €20” or more 
as a result of every cybercrime. At least 25% of them paid “between €200 and €2000” as a result of 
scams or hacking. A surprisingly high “more than €2000” was paid by more than 25% of the victimized 
resolved internet users who were victimized by scams as a direct cost. 
We can thus conclude that all clusters from 2015 suffered more direct costs than the comparable 
clusters from 2017. 
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4.4.5 Conclusion comparison typology between 2015 and 2017 
Comparing the typology of both waves we 
can highlight some remarkable results.  
First, the inexperienced internet user 
(2015) - comparable to the inexperienced 
unknowing internet user (2017) – now 
implements the least security measures of all the clusters, while having the same internet diet as in 
2015. The victimisation rates for all cybercrimes but hacking and the direct costs for all cybercrimes is 
lower in 2017 than in 2015 for the inexperienced internet users.  
Second, the conscious internet user (2015) - comparable to the pessimistic and optimistic experienced 
internet user (2017)- are still implementing quite a lot of security measures. They are implementing 
less maladaptive security measures in 2017 than in 2015. This implicates that they have fewer 
opportunity costs. As for victimisation, they were victimized significantly less by malware and 
monitoring in 2017 than in 2015. This is however not significant for scams and hacking. Also, the direct 
costs they experienced is lower than in 2015 
Finally, the resolved internet user of 2015 - comparable to the pessimistic and optimistic defensive 
internet users (2017)- are implementing more security measures in 2017 than in 2015. The pessimistic 
defensive internet user (2017), however, implements by far the most maladaptive security measures, 
compared to the average amount the resolved internet user (2015) implemented maladaptive security 
measures. This means that the PDI’s are having a lot of opportunity costs in 2017. The optimistic 
defensive internet user is not implementing maladaptive security measures that much. As for 
victimisation the 2015 resolved internet user was significantly more victimized on malware and 
monitoring than the 2017 defensive internet users, this is not so for scams and hacking. Also, the direct 
costs connected to this victimisation was much higher for the resolved internet user (2015) than for 
the defensive internet users (2017). The optimistic defensive internet user is an internet user that is 
optimistic about the internet security and also implements an ample amount of security measures and 
knows how to do this to keep it this way. 
The pessimistic defensive internet user, 
however, is implementing all security 
measures it can, effective or not, 
maladaptive or adaptive, it doesn’t matter.  
The bad or to little implementation of 
security measures combined with the big opportunity costs (cfr. Supra) makes the PDI’s together with 
the IUI’s the clusters of special interest for risk communication. 
The IUI’s in 2017 still implement the 
least security measures 
The PDI’s are implementing all security 
measures they can, effective or not, 
maladaptive or adaptive 
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4.5 PMT-model, predictors of security behaviour (RQ4)  
To get a better insight into the process to the intention to implement security measures we used the 
PMT-model (as outlined in section 2.3). In what follows we discuss the PMT for cybercrime in general, 
for malware and for scams. We also zoom in on the PMT-model for different typologies of special 
interest, namely the PDI’ and IUI’s. Furthermore, we discuss the model-fit, the explanatory value of 
the model and the predictors of the attitude and intention towards security behaviour.  
 
 
Figure 2: PMT-model 
4.5.1 Measuring model 
The measuring model has a good fit for the general population (CFI=.922, TLI=.908, RMSEA=.055). See 
appendix B for the CFA of all measures. They all have strong factor loadings higher than .50. This good 
fit is also true for the measuring model of malware (CFI=.939 TLI=.923 RMSEA=.054) and scams 
(CFI=.949 TLI=.940 RMSEA=.053). The CFA is performed for the general population in every occasion. 
Also here the factor loadings are well above .50. See appendix C and D. 
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4.5.2 Structural equation model: General population 
Bivariate correlations 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
(1) Threat awareness          
(2) Coping awareness  .574**        
(3) Perceived severity .103** .119**       
(4) Perceived 
vulnerability 
-.134** -.183** .262**      
(5) Self-efficacy .335** .470** -.009 -.252**     
(6) Response efficacy .183** .230** .091** -.117** .458**    
(7) Attitude towards 
behaviour 
.229** .245** .39** .058* .247** .457**   
(8) Subjective norm -.094** -.118** .106** .252** -.075** .132** .165**  
(9) Intention towards 
behaviour 
.043 .052 .188** .240** -.035 .187** .329** .416** 
Table 52: Correlations between study variables (*p<.05 **p<.01) 
In table 52 the correlations between the study variables are displayed. We found significant 
correlations between all variables. Strong correlations were found between coping awareness and 
threat awareness (.574**) as was between response efficacy and self-efficacy (.458**). Coping 
awareness correlates strongly with self-efficacy (.470**). Threat awareness and coping awareness on 
their turn had no significant correlation with the intention towards taking security measures. Self-
efficacy also had no correlation with perceived severity or intention towards taking security measures. 
All other variables correlated to a greater or lesser extent. 
Model Fit 
In general, the PMT-models for cybercrime shows an almost good fit looking at a threshold of .90 for 
the CFI and TLI (CFI=.892, TLI= .880, RMSEA=.063). The model for malware and scams are within 
parameters for a good fit looking at the goodness-of-fit indices (model malware: CFI=.917, TLI=.901, 
RMSEA=.061; model scams: CFI=.919, TLI=.911, RMSEA=.065)  
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From  To 𝛃 (all 
cybercrimes) 
B (Malware) B(scams) 
Threat awareness  Perceived 
severity 
.14*** .18*** .03 
Threat awareness Perceived 
vulnerability 
-.13*** -.04 -.28*** 
Coping awareness Self-efficacy .61*** .61*** .51*** 
Coping awareness Response 
efficacy 
.33*** .40*** .26*** 
Self-efficacy  Attitude 
towards 
behaviour 
.04 .01 -.03 
Response efficacy Attitude 
towards 
behaviour 
.54*** .51*** .57*** 
Perceived vulnerability Attitude 
towards 
behaviour 
.04 .09*** .02 
Perceived Severity Attitude 
towards 
behaviour 
.38*** .25*** .30*** 
Attitude towards behaviour Intention 
towards 
behaviour 
.28*** .29*** .30*** 
Subjective norm Intention 
towards 
behaviour 
.45*** .47*** .50*** 
Explained Variance     
𝑹𝟐 (Attitude)  .46 .34 .41 
𝑹𝟐 (Intention)  .28 .31 .34 
𝑹𝟐 (Perceived Severity)  .02 .03 .00 
𝑹𝟐 (Perceived vulnerability)  .02 .00 .09 
𝑹𝟐 (Self-efficacy)  .36 .37 .26 
𝑹𝟐 (Response efficacy)  .10 .16 .06 
Table 53 Total sample: Beta's PMT-model by cybercrime ***p<.001 
If we look at the estimations of the different relations in the model we see that a lot of the variables 
are significantly linked. Furthermore, 46%, 34% and 41% of attitude towards behaviour and 28%, 31% 
and 34% of intention towards behaviour for all cybercrimes, malware and scams respectively can be 
explained by our model (see table 53).  
The strongest predictor that explains the 
variance in attitude towards behaviour is 
response efficacy (cybercrime in βgeneral: 
.54***, βmalware=.51***, βscams=.57***), 
or the feeling that the security measures 
that are implemented are effective in 
protecting against cybercrime. However, just a small percentage of it (10% for cybercrime in general, 
16% for malware and 6% for scams) is explained by coping awareness.  
Response efficacy and Perceived 
severity are the strongest predictors of 
attitude towards behaviour 
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Perceived severity, or the feeling that a cybercrime is severe, is another good (although less good than 
response-efficacy) predictor of attitude towards behaviour (cybercrime in βgeneral: .38***, 
βmalware=.25***, βscams=.30***). Perceived severity is, however, also very little explained by threat 
awareness. This means that making people aware of certain security measures or cybercrime threats 
is not enough for them to be convinced that these measures are effective or that these cybercrimes 
are severe. These two are nevertheless the most important predictors of attitude. 
Perceived vulnerability, or the feeling of being vulnerable for cybercrimes is only a very weak predictor 
(βmalware=.09***) for attitude towards security behaviour against malware, for scams and cybercrime 
in general this is not the case. Self-efficacy, or the feeling that they can implement a certain security 
measure in an effective way is no significant predictor of attitude whatsoever. Self-efficacy, however, 
is explained a lot for cybercrime in general (36%), malware (37%) and scams (26%) by coping 
awareness. 
Threat awareness is a predictor of perceived severity for cybercrime in general (βgeneral=.14***) and 
malware (βmalware=.18***), this is however not the case for scams. The awareness of scams is thus 
less important to predict perceived severity. Surprisingly, threat awareness is a significant negative 
predictor of perceived vulnerability for cybercrime in general (βgeneral=-.13**) and scams (βgeneral=-
.28**), this is the opposite of what we expected. The more one is aware of cybercrimes and scams, the 
less vulnerable someone feels.  
The intention toward behaviour is explained for 28% by the attitude towards behaviour and the 
subjective norm. The most important predictor of the intention to implement security measures is for 
all three models not the attitude towards behaviour (βgeneral: .28***, βmalware=.29***, 
βscams=.30***) but the subjective norm (βgeneral: .45***, βmalware=.47***, βscams=.50***). In other 
words, the perceived social pressure from others towards security behaviour is more important than 
attitude as a predictor of intention toward security behaviour. 
4.5.3 Structural equation model: Risk typologies 
Earlier we stated that the pessimistic experienced internet users and the inexperienced unknowing 
internet users are the typologies which could benefit the most from risk-communication. Therefore 
we constructed the three models also for these two clusters to get a better insight. 
Pessimistic defensive internet user 
In general, the PMT-models for cybercrime applied to pessimistic defensive internet users shows an 
almost good fit looking at the goodness-of-fit indices (CFI=.906, TLI=.897, RMSEA=.056). The model for 
malware and scams are also within parameters for a good fit (model malware, CFI=.915, TLI=.899, 
RMSEA=.064; model scams: CFI=.924, TLI=.915, RMSEA=.063)  
  
The social pressure towards security behaviour is a stronger predictor 
than attitude towards behaviour for intention towards behaviour  
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From  To 𝚩 (all 
cybercrimes) 
B (Malware) B(scams) 
Threat awareness  Perceived severity .06 .12 -.10 
Threat awareness Perceived 
vulnerability 
-.09 -.05 -.21 
Coping awareness Self-efficacy .64*** .68*** .52*** 
Coping awareness Response efficacy .44*** .56*** .27*** 
Self-efficacy  Attitude towards 
behaviour 
-.02 .10 .10 
Response efficacy Attitude towards 
behaviour 





.02 .11 .17 
Perceived Severity Attitude towards 
behaviour 





.30*** .30*** .29*** 
Subjective norm Intention towards 
behaviour 
.45*** .56*** .53*** 
Explained Variance 
 
𝑹𝟐 (Attitude)  .45 .24 .39 
𝑹𝟐 (Intention)  .29 .40 .37 
𝑹𝟐 (Perceived 
Severity) 
 .00 .01 .01 
𝑹𝟐 (Perceived 
vulnerability) 
 .01 .01 .05 
𝑹𝟐 (Self-efficacy)  .38 .45 .26 
𝑹𝟐 (Response 
efficacy) 
 .20 .34 .07 
Table 54 PDI: Beta's PMT-model by cybercrime ***p<.001 
Also for the pessimistic defensive internet 
users perceived severity and response 
efficacy are the strongest predictors of 
attitude towards behaviour (see table 54). 
Surprisingly though the predictive value of 
response efficacy takes a nose-dive for 
malware but not for scams or cybercrime 
in general (βgeneral: .62***, βmalware=.35***, βscams=.55***). A tentative explanation could be that 
the PDI’s are more sceptical towards the efficacy of security measures against malware as they 
implement the most security measures effective or not (cfr. Supra).  
Threat awareness has for the PDI’s no predictive value whatsoever, not for perceived severity or 
perceived vulnerability. However, response efficacy for the PDI's is surprisingly more explained by 




2 =.07). Coping awareness is thus a good predictor for response efficacy  (βgeneral: 
PDI’s explanatory value of RE is high for 
cybercrime in general and scams but 
not for malware 
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.44***, βmalware=.56***, βscams=.27***). These insights mean that for PDI’s being made aware of the 
possible security measures (and how to use them) will help their attitude to implement these security 
measures. This however only holds true to a lesser extent for malware. 
Attitude towards behaviour (𝑅𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑐𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠
2 =.45, 𝑅𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒
2 =.24, 𝑅𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑚𝑠




2 =.37) are explained in line with the population 
in general. 
Just like the general population, the subjective norm (βgeneral: .45***, βmalware=.56***, 
βscams=.53***) is a better predictor than attitude towards behaviour (βgeneral: .30***, 
βmalware=.30***, βscams=.29***)  for intention towards behaviour.  
Inexperienced unknowing internet users 
In general, the PMT-models for cybercrime applied to the inexperienced unknowing internet users 
shows an equal almost good fit looking at the goodness-of-fit indices (CFI=.878, TLI=.866, 
RMSEA=.066). The model for malware and scams are also an almost good fit according to the 
goodness-of-fit indices (model malware: CFI=.905, TLI=.887, RMSEA=.065; model scams: CFI=.901, 
TLI=.891 RMSEA=.072).  
From  To 𝚩 (all 
cybercrimes) 
B (Malware) B(scams) 
Threat awareness  Perceived severity .14 .23* .05 
Threat awareness Perceived 
vulnerability 
.03 .11 -.14 
Coping awareness Self-efficacy .45*** .47*** .38*** 
Coping awareness Response efficacy .24*** .35*** .22** 
Self-efficacy  Attitude towards 
behaviour 
-.05 -.07 -.11 
Response efficacy Attitude towards 
behaviour 





.10 .16** .09 
Perceived Severity Attitude towards 
behaviour 





.31*** .30*** .26*** 
Subjective norm Intention towards 
behaviour 
.53*** .50*** .55*** 
Explained Variance 
𝑹𝟐 (Attitude)  .51 .42 .40 
𝑹𝟐 (Intention)  .37 .34 .37 
𝑹𝟐 (Perceived 
Severity) 
 .03 .06 .01 
𝑹𝟐 (Perceived 
vulnerability) 
 .00 .01 .03 
𝑹𝟐 (Self-efficacy)  .20 .25 .13 
𝑹𝟐 (Response 
efficacy) 
 .05 .11 .04 
Table 55 IUI: Beta's PMT-model by cybercrime ***p<.001 **p<.01 *p<.05 
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In line with the general population and the PDI’s, response efficacy (βgeneral: .59***, βmalware=.60***, 
βscams=.54***)  and perceived severity (βgeneral: .38***, βmalware=.17***, βscams=.32***) are good 
predictors of attitude to take security measures against cybercrime for the inexperienced unknowing 
internet users (see table 55).  
The explanatory value of response 
efficacy here stays very high for 
cybercrime in general, malware and 









2 =.04) are for the IUI’s less explained by coping awareness 
or threat awareness than for the general population or the pessimistic defensive internet users. This 
means that just making the IUI aware of threats and security measures won’t be enough to change the 
perceived severity and response efficacy of the IUI’s. We should thus search for more predictors as 
response efficacy and perceived severity are still very strong predictors for attitude towards behaviour 
(cfr. Supra). 
Perceived vulnerability is for the IUI’s a weak predictor (βmalware=.16***)  of the attitude towards 
security behaviour against malware, this is not the case for cybercrime in general or scams. This is, 
however, only for the IUI’s significant. 
The subjective norm (βgeneral: .53***, βmalware=.50***, βscams=.55***) also here stays a better 
predictor than attitude towards behaviour (βgeneral: .31***, βmalware=.30***, βscams=.26***) for 
intention towards behaviour (𝑅𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑐𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠
2 =.37, 𝑅𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒
2 =.34, 𝑅𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑚𝑠
2 =.37).   
Perceived vulnerability is a weak 
predictor of attitude towards security 
behaviour against malware for the IUI’s 
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Comparison between2017 and 2015 SEM analysis of PMT-model 
 
Figure 2 PMT-model 2015 (n=1033) 
The model of 2015 also reached an 
almost good fit (CFI=.869, TLI=.850, 
RMSEA=.078), If we look at the SEM 
analysis of the PMT model proposed in 
2015 we see that the same was true. 
Response efficacy and perceived 
severity were the important predictors 
of attitude towards security behaviour. It is however noticeable that attitude towards behaviour now 
is a less good predictor than in 2015. In 2017 𝛽𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒→𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛=.28**** and in 2015 
𝛽𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒→𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛=.41****. Attitude towards behaviour was much more explained in 2015 by 
perceived severity and response efficacy. This means that there could be more predictors in 2017 that 
predict attitude towards behaviour. Subjective norm stayed the same strong predictor of intention 
towards behaviour (𝛽𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚→𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛=.48***). 
Attitude towards behaviour is in 2017 a 
less strong predictor than in 2015 for 
intention towards behaviour 
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4.5.4 Conclusion PMT model 
We can conclude that perceived severity and response efficacy are good predictors of attitude towards 
security behaviour. The other constructs (Perceived vulnerability and self-efficacy) are less good 
predictors. This means that in general people have a higher attitude towards implementing security 
measures if they perceive the threat as severe (perceived severity) and if they think their security 
measures are effective (response efficacy). Feeling that they are able to implement these security 
measures (self-efficacy) or that they are vulnerable to be victimized by cybercrime (perceived 
vulnerability) has less effect on the attitude towards implementing security measures. This attitude is 
in its turn -together with the subjective norm- a good predictor of the intention towards security 
behaviour. In general, a good part of intention and attitude is explained by the proposed PMT-model. 
It is however interesting to see that perceived severity and response efficacy is explained very little in 
current PMT-model by threat and coping awareness, this is especially true for the inexperienced 
unknowing internet users and the population in general. This means that coping and threat awareness 
are not the only predictor of perceived severity and response efficacy and thus that there are other 
constructs that additionally could play a predicting role. Searching and finding these predictors could 
demystify the process towards the intention to implement security measures even further and could 
help risk communication towards the IUI’s. 
This makes room for further research to track down what influences the perceived severity and 
response efficacy of someone. Furthermore, it seems interesting to search for other constructs 
predicting the attitude towards security behaviour.  
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5 Discussion 
5.1 Main results  
In general, the internet is used most for information linked activities like checking emails, retrieving 
information, searching news sites and using social network sites. The Belgian population also uses the 
internet for electronic banking, but to a lesser extent. 
Looking at the perceived safety of the online activities, downloading, using social network sites and 
online games are considered the least safe. Electronic banking, retrieving information, visiting news 
sites and email are considered the safest of online activities. 
Most people seem to be aware of the dangers of the internet and are implementing quite a lot of 
security measures to protect themselves against cybercrime. This, however, doesn’t hold up for the 
inexperienced internet users, who are the least aware of cybercrime threats and security measures, 
and are implementing the least security measures.  
In 2017, people are implementing more technological adaptive security measures and less maladaptive 
security measures than in 2015. However, over 5% of the population do not implement any security 
measure against any cybercrime in 2017. Even stronger, 25% of the population do not take any action 
against monitoring. People who do not know if they were victimized, implement significantly fewer 
security measures. Hereby, they are also more likely to be a carrier of malware or other cybercrimes 
without knowing or even planning to do something about it. Therefore, they should be considered to 
be especially vulnerable. A risk awareness campaign could help educate these people (see 5.2 
recommendations for risk communication). 
Cybercrime in general still makes a lot of victims. Malware and monitoring however made significantly 
fewer victims in 2017 than in 2015. There is a large group of people who do not know if they were 
victimized in 2017, the same was true in 2015.  Malware makes the most victims in general, but scams 
cause for the highest monetary costs. Monitoring is considered to be the least expensive. For all the 
cybercrimes but scams, more than 80% of the victims suffered no direct costs in 2017. The monetary 
direct costs in 2017 are significantly lower than in 2015.  
For defence cost, people pay the most for malware and hacking. These are, however, not the most 
expensive cybercrimes in terms of direct monetary costs. Direct non-monetary costs are not 
significantly different for the different cybercrimes. 
In 2017, we differentiated between five clusters compared to four clusters in 2015. These clusters are: 
optimistic defensive internet users (ODI), pessimistic defensive internet users (PDI), inexperienced 
unknowing internet users (IUI), optimistic experienced internet users (OEI) and pessimistic 
experienced internet users (PEI).  
In the data we can further differentiate on their internet diet: novice internet users, intermediate 
internet users and advanced internet users. IUI’s are generally novice internet users, PDI’s and ODI’s 
are generally intermediate internet users, OEI’s and PEI’s are more advanced internet users. The 
breakdown into these three bigger groups also holds up when considering their security measures. The 
novice internet users implement the least security measures, followed by the advanced internet users 
and the intermediate internet users. The PEI’s and OEI’s don’t differ significantly in their security 
behaviour. The PDI’s and ODI’s implement the same amount of adaptive security measures. The PDI’s, 
however, use the most (and significantly more than the rest) maladaptive security measures. This could 
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indicate bigger opportunity losses as these maladaptive security measures include stopping or 
reducing internet usage and stopping or reducing certain activities online.  
The PDI’s are significantly more victimized by hacking and monitoring and are the most victimized by 
scams (although not significantly more than the rest). This means that their security measures are not 
really effective as they do implement the most security measures. The IUI’s are surprisingly victimized 
less often than expected by hacking and monitoring. They are however also significantly less aware of 
cyberthreats and security measures, these results lend to support that they are not able to notice when 
they are victimized or not. PEI’s are more victimized by malware then we would expect, this could be 
explained by the fact that s/he uses the internet more often and in a more advanced way and thus 
encounters more cybercrimes. 
The IUI’s implement the least security measures, have relatively the most victims paying and pay the 
most money as a consequence of scams. Victimisation rate, however, is not linked to the amount 
someone pays as a direct cost following a victimisation event. 
Opportunity costs are believed to be felt by every cluster but the OEI’s. Especially the PEI’s and the 
IUI’s perceive most opportunity costs.  
The combination of the reduction in victimisation rate of malware and monitoring and an increase of 
technical adaptive security measures makes us believe that people in 2017 are better armed against 
cyber criminality than in 2015. The victimisation of scams and hacking, however, hasn’t changed in a 
significant way, despite the growing security measures that are used. Overall, the direct monetary 
costs have declined compared to 2015. 
Considering the PMT-model, we see that the perceived severity and response efficacy are the most 
important predictors of attitude towards security behaviour for the general population for cybercrime 
in general. The other constructs are less good predictors. This means that people who perceive a 
certain threat as severe (perceived severity) and or think their security measure is effective (response 
efficacy) have a higher attitude towards implementing these security measures. How good they 
themselves are in implementing this security measures (self-efficacy) or how much chance there is to 
get victimized (perceived vulnerability) is less important as these have no significant predictive value. 
Except for malware with the IUI’s where the perceived vulnerability is a significant predictor of 
attitude. Only a small percentage of perceived severity and response efficacy, however, is explained 
by threat- and coping awareness. Attitude towards security behaviour is explained for 46% by response 
efficacy and perceived severity. 
Together with the subjective norm, attitude towards behaviour explains 28% of the intention towards 
implementing security measures against cybercrime in general. It is, however, important to note that 
subjective norm is a stronger predictor than the attitude towards behaviour for intention. 
5.2 Recommendations for risk communication 
The OEI’s and PDI’s are the two clusters that are of special interest for risk communication if we look 
at the victimisation rate combined with the security measures. This does not mean the other clusters 
don’t need or could benefit from risk communication.  
5.2.1  Recommendations to reach out to inexperienced unknowing internet users  
In line with the results of 2015, we believe the IUI’s to be an important target group because they are 
not cognizant of being a victim or not; they are significantly less aware of cybercrime threats and 
security measures that can be used. On top of that, they experience many opportunity costs.  
77 
Discussion - Recommendations for risk communication  
Considering the PMT-model we can conclude that social norm can be seen as the strongest predictor 
to change the behaviour of the IUI’s to implement security behaviour. Also, attitude towards this 
security behaviour can be seen as an important though less strong predictor of this security behaviour. 
Attitude towards taking security behaviour is being influenced mainly by response efficacy and 
perceived severity. With other words to facilitate a shift in attitude with the IUI’s, you should mainly 
convince them that the security actions they take are effective in protecting them and that the harm 
they could experience if they are victimized by cybercrime is severe. The feeling that they are able to 
implement these security measures themselves (self-efficacy) or that they are vulnerable to get 
victimized by cybercrime (perceived vulnerability) is less important to change the attitude towards 
security behaviour. Only with malware, the feeling of being vulnerable to get victimized plays a role in 
the attitude towards taking security behaviour against malware. 
Making the IUI’s aware of the cybercrimes and security measures is not enough to facilitate a shift in 
response efficacy and perceived severity. When reaching out to IUI’s, you should explain the 
substantial risk of the different cybercrimes and educate them on how to take effective security 
measures. It is also important not to increase their opportunity risks while educating them of the 
severity of the risks, this would increase the digital divide already existing. 
5.2.2 Recommendations to reach out to pessimistic defensive internet users 
The PDI’s are believed to be another important target group. They implement many security measures 
but are doing this in an ineffective way. They still report to be victimized and experience a lot of 
opportunity costs trying to protect themselves.  
Considering the PMT-model we can conclude just as with the IUI’s that also here social norm can be 
seen as the strongest predictor followed by the attitude towards security behaviour to implement 
security behaviour.  
Attitude towards taking security behaviour is also here being influenced mainly by response efficacy 
and perceived severity. However, the predictive value of response efficacy takes a nose dive with 
malware. Taking into account that the PDI’s implement the most security measures, effective or not, 
this means that to facilitate a shift in attitude with the PDI’s, you should mainly convince them that, 
and explain to them which, security actions are effective in protecting them against cybercrime. 
Furthermore, it is also important to convince them of the severeness of being victimized to facilitate a 
shift in attitude towards security behaviour.  
The feeling that they are able to implement these security measures themselves (self-efficacy) or that 
they are vulnerable to get victimized by cybercrime (perceived vulnerability) are also with the PDI’s 
less important to change the attitude towards security behaviour.  
Making the PDI’s aware of the security measures they can take is having a high impact on the response 
efficacy for all cybercrimes but scams. This, however, is not enough to ensure the PDI’s implement 
these security measures in an effective way. Therefore, it is important to explain to the PDI’s what 
security measures are effective to take and what security measures are ineffective and should be 
avoided to minimize opportunity costs. Making them aware of the cybercrimes that exist have no 
influence whatsoever and is thus not necessary.  
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5.2.3 Recommendations for the other typologies 
If we look at the ODI’s we see they mainly experience opportunity costs. We should inform them more 
about what is and what isn’t a risky behaviour online. Especially with more than half of the ODI’s 
perceiving every online activity as neutral or safer (including downloading).  
ODI’s, PDI’s and IUI’s are novice to intermediate internet users. With the increasing media attention 
for cybercrime, it seems important to also make sure that less internet savvy people are not getting 
left behind because of opportunity costs and victimisation by cybercrime. Also, PEI’s are experiencing 
these opportunity costs.  
PEI’s and OEI’s should not be forgotten when informing about the safety in online behaviour especially 
because they engage more often and in more advanced activities online and are thus more often being 
exposed to cybercrime. 
5.3 Scope, limitations of the research and future research 
This study adds to the research about internet users’ intention to take security measures against 
cybercrime. It builds further on the research executed in 2015 with the same basic framework, namely 
the PMT-model. This research adds by extending the PMT-model with threat awareness and coping 
awareness as proposed in the previous wave and implemented in other research (Hanus & Wu, 2016; 
Verdegem et al., 2015).  
The results of this research and the research of 2015 confirm that the PMT framework is a good 
framework to analyse the process of taking security measures against cybercrime. This study finds a 
significant relation between perceived severity and attitude towards security behaviour and response 
efficacy and attitude towards security behaviour. This relationship was also uncovered with the data 
of the 2015 survey. If we make a longitudinal comparison we can see that perceived severity and 
response efficacy, however, explained more of the attitude towards security behaviour in 2015 than 
in 2017. The coping awareness that is added in 2017 has a significant relation with response efficacy. 
The threat awareness, however, is not a significant predictor of perceived severity, except for the 
inexperienced unknowing internet users where it does significantly predict the perceived severity of 
malware.  
By dividing the costs linked to cybercrime in direct monetary cost, direct non-monetary costs, 
opportunity costs and defence costs we were able to get a more fine-grained image of the costs 
connected to cybercrime. because the high amount of people paying nothing when victimized and the 
relative low victimisation rates, however, it was impossible to get a clear number on the average 
amount of direct monetary or even defence costs. It is clear that opportunity costs are perceived quite 
often by everyone but the optimistic experienced internet users. There was no difference found 
between the clusters in terms of the non-monetary direct costs operationalized by the harm-
assessment framework (Greenfield & Paoli, 2013). This could indicate that the harm-assessment 
framework is not fine-grained enough in the context of citizen-research.  
The limitations of our study made it impossible to know how security measures were implemented. 
This way we couldn’t know if security measures were effectively implemented or not. The pessimistic 
defensive internet users for example show by far the most implemented security measures but are still 
victimized the most by many cybercrimes. Future research could assess the implemented security 
measures in a more qualitative manner. 
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With direct costs only being experienced by victims, more specified research should be executed 
towards victims to get a better insight into these direct costs. The results for direct costs of this 
research is only of an exploratory nature.  
Furthermore, it was impossible in our study to find out if the amount of security measures and the 
perceived opportunity costs were a result of previous victimisation or if they were already present 
before the victimisation. This would implicate totally different conclusions. Future research might 
increase our insight into the decision-making process to implement certain security measures and this 
way demystify this limitation.  
To broaden and strengthen the PMT-model, more constructs should be added and tested. Especially 
constructs that influence perceived severity and response efficacy are of exceptional interest. 
Furthermore, it would be interesting to get a better insight into how the subjective norm is formed as 
this was a strong predictor of intention towards security behaviour in the research of 2015 and in 
current research. 
A broader scope of this research area should also implement IoT devices as these are becoming more 
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Appendix A: Operationalising, Mean, Standard deviation and Cronbach's alpha 
Construct Question in survey Answer Options Mean SD Cronbach's 𝜶 
Gender What is your gender? Man/Woman/Other    
Birth year In what year were you born? (e.g. 1985) Open    
Residence Where do you live?  Flanders/Wallonia/Brussels    
Language What language do you speak? Dutch/French/English    









Incapacitated for work/on 
long-term sick leave 
Other, namely: 
   
Diploma What is your highest diploma? No diploma 
Primary 
Lower secondary 
Upper secondary (ASO) 
Upper secondary technical and 
art (TSO/KSO) 





   
Family situation What best describes your family situation? 
Minors are children under 18. 
Married/living together 
without minor children 
Married/living together with 




Single without minor children 
Single with minor children 
Living with parent(s)/relatives 
Living with others 
Student in student 
accommodation/digs 
Internet_device Which equipment do you have at your disposal at 
home? (multiple answers possible) 
Desktop computer 
Laptop 
Tablet (e.g. iPad) 
Smartphone (e.g. Samsung 
Galaxy) 




None of the above 
   
Internet_activity Which of the following activities have you done 
in the last month using your device(s)? (multiple 
answers are possible).  
 
 
Question is asked for every indicated device in 
“Internet_device” 
To retrieve information 
To visit news sites 
To E-mail 
To do online banking 
To online game (e.g. games on 
Facebook, multiplayer games 
on a console...) 
To use social media (e.g. 
Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, 
Snapchat...) 
To chat 
To conduct phone calls over 
the internet (e.g. Skype, 
Facetime, Duo...) 
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To purchase and/or sell goods 
online (e.g. Music, movies, 
software, books, clothing...) 
To download (e.g. music, 
movies, software, books...) 
To stream (play files without 
downloading them e.g. 
youtube, Spotify, Netflix, 
Popcorn Time...) 
Internet_usage_place How often do you use the internet in a typical 
week? 
1. At home during work days 
2. At home during weekend 




Less than weekly 
Less than daily 
Less than 1 hour per day 
Between 1 and 3 hours per 
day 
Between 3 and 5 hours per 
day 
Between 5 and 8 hours per 
day 








Internet_activity_frequency Which of the following activities have you done 
in the last month using your device(s)? 
(multiple answers are possible) 
1. To retrieve information   
2. To visit news sites   
3. To E-mail   
4. To do online banking   
5. To online game (e.g. games on 
Facebook, multiplayer games on a 
console...) 
  
6. To use social media (e.g. Facebook, 
Twitter, Instagram, Snapchat...) 
  
7. To chat   
Never 
At least yearly 
At least monthly 
At least weekly 
At least daily 


























8. To conduct phone calls over the 
internet (e.g. Skype, Facetime, Duo...) 
  
9. To purchase and/or sell goods 
online (e.g. Music, movies, software, 
books, clothing...) 
  
10. To download (e.g. music, movies, 
software, books...) 
  
11. To stream (play files without 
downloading them e.g. youtube, 
Spotify, Netflix, Popcorn Time...) 
  
 
Internet_safety_general To what extent do you agree with the following 
statements? 
1. I am optimistic about the safety of the 
internet. 
2. I am concerned about internet safety. 
(Inverted) 
3. I have every confidence that the 
internet is safe. 
4. I am satisfied with the safety of the 
internet. 
5 point likert scale  











Internet_safety_activities How safe do you think these activities are in 
general? 
1. To retrieve Information 
2. To visit news sites 
3. To e-mail 
4. To do online banking 
5. To online game (e.g. games on 
Facebook, multiplayer games on a 
console...) 
6. To use social media (e.g. Facebook, 
Twitter, Instagram, Snapchat...) 
7. To chat 
Not safe at all – Not Safe – 



























8. To conduct phone calls over the internet 
(e.g. Skype, Facetime, Duo...) 
9. To purchase and/or sell goods online 
(e.g. Music, movies, software, books, 
clothing...) 
10. To download (e.g. music, movies, 
software, books...) 
11. To stream (play files without 
downloading them e.g. youtube, 
Spotify, Netflix, Popcorn Time...) 





Totally not aware – Not aware 











Coping_awareness How aware are you with these 
countermeasures?  
(if you are aware of a software pack that cover 
more than one countermeasure (e.g. an 
automatic password generator, anti-virus and 
backup program in one.) you can thick the box 
with every countermeasures.) 
1. Instal software e.g. anti-virus, anti-
spyware, anti-phishing, cryptolocker, 
backup software 
2. Set up software that is included with 
your operating system (e.g. firewall, 
defender) 
3. Update software en operating systems 
4. Secure a wifi network 
5. Set up difficult to guess passwords for 
accounts and home network 
Totally not aware – Not aware 























6. Check the origin and the document itself 
on reliability 
7. Be on your guard when giving personal 
information to others 
8. Reduce internet usage 
9. Reducing or stopping certain activities 
e.g. online banking, downloading... 
Malware_Perceived_severity To what extent do you agree with the following 
statements? 
1. I think malware is an important problem 
2. I think malware should be taken 
seriously 
3. I think malware is a severe problem 
 
5 point likert scale  











Malware_Perceived_vulnerability To what extent do you agree with the following 
statements? 
1. It is possible that I become a victim of 
malware 
2. It is probable that I become a victim of 
malware 
3. The risk is big that I become a victim of 
malware 
5 point likert scale  











Malware_Self_efficacy To what extent do you agree with the following 
statements? 
1. Taking the necessary security measures 
against malware is easy 
2. I feel comfortable taking security 
measures against malware 
3. I possess the knowledge and skills to 
take the necessary security measures 
against malware 
5 point likert scale  












Malware_Response_efficacy To what extent do you agree with the following 
statements? 
1. Safety measures against malware are 
effective in preventing malware 
2. By taking security measures, I can avoid 
malware 
3. I’m less likely to become a victim of 
malware if I take security measures 
5 point likert scale  









Malware_Attitude To what extent do you agree with the following 
statements? 
1. Taking security measures against 
malware is a good idea 
2. I love the idea of taking anti-malware 
measures 
3. Taking security measures against 
malware is important 
5 point likert scale  









Malware_Subjective_norm To what extent do you agree with the following 
statements? 
1. My friends think that I should protect 
myself from malware 
2. People I look up to think that I should 
protect myself from malware 
3. People with whom I compare myself 
think that I should protect myself from 
malware 
5 point likert scale  









Malware_Intention To what extent do you agree with the following 
statements? 
1. I'm probably going to take (more) 
security measures against malware 
2. I'm sure I'm going to take (more) 
security measures against malware 
5 point likert scale  











3. It's possible that I'm going to take 
(more) security measures against 
malware 
Scams_Perceived_severity To what extent do you agree with the following 
statements? 
1. I think Scams are an important problem 
2. I think Scams should be taken seriously 
3. I think Scams are a severe problem 
 
5 point likert scale  









Scams_Perceived_vulnerability To what extent do you agree with the following 
statements? 
1. It is possible that I become a victim of 
Scams 
2. It is probable that I become a victim of 
Scams 
3. The risk is big that I become a victim of 
Scams 
5 point likert scale  









Scams_Self_efficacy To what extent do you agree with the following 
statements? 
1. Taking the necessary security measures 
against Scams is easy 
2. I feel comfortable taking security 
measures against Scams 
3. I possess the knowledge and skills to 
take the necessary security measures 
against Scams 
5 point likert scale  









Scams_Response_efficacy To what extent do you agree with the following 
statements? 
1. Safety measures against Scams are 
effective in preventing Scams 
2. By taking security measures, I can avoid 
Scams 
5 point likert scale  












3. I’m less likely to become a victim of 
Scams if I take security measures 
Scams_Attitude To what extent do you agree with the following 
statements? 
1. Taking security measures against Scams 
is a good idea 
2. I love the idea of taking anti-Scams 
measures 
3. Taking security measures against Scams 
is important 
5 point likert scale  










Scams_Subjective_norm To what extent do you agree with the following 
statements? 
1. My friends think that I should protect 
myself from Scams 
2. People I look up to think that I should 
protect myself from Scams 
3. People with whom I compare myself 
think that I should protect myself from 
Scams 
5 point likert scale  











Scams_Intention To what extent do you agree with the following 
statements? 
1. I'm probably going to take (more) 
security measures against Scams 
2. I'm sure I'm going to take (more) 
security measures against Scams 
3. It's possible that I'm going to take 
(more) security measures against Scams 
5 point likert scale  










Hacking_Perceived_severity To what extent do you agree with the following 
statements? 
1. I think Hacking is an important problem 
2. I think Hacking should be taken seriously 
3. I think Hacking is a severe problem 
 
5 point likert scale  












Hacking_Perceived_vulnerability To what extent do you agree with the following 
statements? 
1. It is possible that I become a victim of 
Hacking 
2. It is probable that I become a victim of 
Hacking 
3. The risk is big that I become a victim of 
Hacking 
5 point likert scale  











Monitoring_Perceived_severity To what extent do you agree with the following 
statements? 
1. I think Monitoring is an important 
problem 
2. I think Monitoring should be taken 
seriously 
3. I think Monitoring is a severe problem 
 
5 point likert scale  










Monitoring_Perceived_vulnerability To what extent do you agree with the following 
statements? 
1. It is possible that I become a victim of 
Monitoring 
2. It is probable that I become a victim of 
Monitoring 
3. The risk is big that I become a victim of 
Monitoring 
5 point likert scale  













Cybercrime_Self_efficacy To what extent do you agree with the following 
statements? 
1. Taking the necessary security measures 
against Cybercrime is easy 
2. I feel comfortable taking security 
measures against Cybercrime 
3. I possess the knowledge and skills to 
take the necessary security measures 
against Cybercrime 
5 point likert scale  












Cybercrime_Response_efficacy To what extent do you agree with the following 
statements? 
1. Safety measures against Cybercrime are 
effective in preventing Cybercrime 
2. By taking security measures, I can avoid 
Cybercrime 
3. I’m less likely to become a victim of 
Cybercrime if I take security measures 
5 point likert scale  












Cybercrime_Attitude To what extent do you agree with the following 
statements? 
1. Taking security measures against 
Cybercrime is a good idea 
2. I love the idea of taking anti-Cybercrime 
measures 
3. Taking security measures against 
Cybercrime is important 
5 point likert scale  














Cybercrime_Subjective_norm To what extent do you agree with the following 
statements? 
1. My friends think that I should protect 
myself from Cybercrime 
2. People I look up to think that I should 
protect myself from Cybercrime 
3. People with whom I compare myself 
think that I should protect myself from 
Cybercrime 
5 point likert scale  









Cybercrime_Intention To what extent do you agree with the following 
statements? 
1. I'm probably going to take (more) 
security measures against Cybercrime 
2. I'm sure I'm going to take (more) 
security measures against Cybercrime 
5 point likert scale  














3. It's possible that I'm going to take 
(more) security measures against 
Cybercrime 
Victimization Have you, or anyone else in your family fell victim 








Yes, someone else in my family 
Yes, both me and someone 
else in my family 
I guess so 
No 
I don’t know 
   
Malware_frequency  
(n=216) 
In the last 12 months, how many times did y(our) 
family fell victim to Malware? 
Once, Twice, Three times, Four 
times, Five times or more, I 
don’t know 
3,64 2,313  
Malware_report Did you report this incident (multiple answers 
possible) 
Yes, to the police 
Yes, to the internet provider 
Yes, to another body 
No 
   
Malware_defence_cost 
(n=246) 
How much do you estimate you spend to defend 
you(r family) against malware last year? (e.g. 
€10). 
Open question  
+ “I don’t know” 
€61,99 €43,16  
Malware_direct_monetary_cost 
(n=198) 
How big were the financial consequences of 
malware the last 12 months? Think about costs 
linked to damage, repair, ransom. Give the 
answer in € (e.g. €10) 




Indicate how harmful you estimate the malware 
incident for you (r family) in terms of different 
components. 
Choose the appropriate answer for each item. 
  
When assessing the severity of the damage, 


















catastrophic damage could mean that you can no 
longer perform a particular component for more 
than 6 months (e.g. performing daily operations, 
protecting reputation, ensuring privacy). 
insignificant means that you cannot do a 
particular part for a short while. 
harmless means that this incident does not affect 
the questioned. 
does not apply means that this incident cannot 
affect the component. 
 





In the last 12 months, how many times did y(our) 
family fell victim to Scams? 
Once, Twice, Three times, Four 
times, Five times or more, I 
don’t know 
2,70 2,170  
Scams_report Did you report this incident (multiple answers 
possible) 
Yes, to the police 
Yes, to the banc/financial body 
Yes, to the consumer 
organisation 
Yes, to another body 
No 
   
Scams_defence_cost 
(n=73) 
How much do you estimate you spend to defend 
you(r family) against Scams last year? (e.g. €10). 
Open question  
+ “I don’t know” 
€51,40 €34,94  
Scams_direct_monetary_cost 
(n=90) 
How big were the financial consequences of 
Scams the last 12 months? Think about costs 
linked to damage, repair, ransom. Give the 
answer in € (e.g. €10) 





Indicate how harmful you estimate the Scams 
incident for you (r family) in terms of different 
components. 
Choose the appropriate answer for each item. 
  
When assessing the severity of the damage, 
please use the following criterion: 
  
catastrophic damage could mean that you can no 
longer perform a particular component for more 
than 6 months (e.g. performing daily operations, 
protecting reputation, ensuring privacy). 
insignificant means that you cannot do a 
particular part for a short while. 
harmless means that this incident does not affect 
the questioned. 
does not apply means that this incident cannot 
affect the component. 
 



















In the last 12 months, how many times did y(our) 
family fell victim to Hacking? 
Once, Twice, Three times, Four 
times, Five times or more, I 
don’t know 
3,27 2,37  
Hacking_report Did you report this incident (multiple answers 
possible) 
Yes, to the police 
Yes, to the internet provider 
Yes, to the company of which 
the account was hacked 
Yes, to another body 
No 
   
Hacking_defence_cost 
(n=137) 
How much do you estimate you spend to defend 
you(r family) against Hacking last year? (e.g. €10). 
Open question  
+ “I don’t know” 





How big were the financial consequences of 
Hacking the last 12 months? Think about costs 
linked to damage, repair, ransom. Give the 
answer in € (e.g. €10) 
Open question €109,97 €953,81  
Hacking_direct_non-monetary_cost 
(n=99) 
Indicate how harmful you estimate the Hacking 
incident for you (r family) in terms of different 
components. 
Choose the appropriate answer for each item. 
  
When assessing the severity of the damage, 
please use the following criterion: 
  
catastrophic damage could mean that you can no 
longer perform a particular component for more 
than 6 months (e.g. performing daily operations, 
protecting reputation, ensuring privacy). 
insignificant means that you cannot do a 
particular part for a short while. 
harmless means that this incident does not affect 
the questioned. 
does not apply means that this incident cannot 
affect the component. 
 



















In the last 12 months, how many times did y(our) 
family fell victim to Monitoring? 
Once, Twice, Three times, Four 
times, Five times or more, I 
don’t know 
5,69 1,025  
Monitoring_report Did you report this incident (multiple answers 
possible) 
Yes, to the police 
Yes, to the internet provider 
Yes, government 
Yes to another body 






How much do you estimate you spend to defend 
you(r family) against Monitoring last year? (e.g. 
€10). 
Open question  
+ “I don’t know” 
€53,48 €70,51  
Monitoring_direct_monetary_cost 
(n=144) 
How big were the financial consequences of 
Monitoring the last 12 months? Think about 
costs linked to damage, repair, ransom. Give the 
answer in € (e.g. €10) 




Indicate how harmful you estimate the 
Monitoring incident for you (r family) in terms of 
different components. 
Choose the appropriate answer for each item. 
  
When assessing the severity of the damage, 
please use the following criterion: 
  
catastrophic damage could mean that you can no 
longer perform a particular component for more 
than 6 months (e.g. performing daily operations, 
protecting reputation, ensuring privacy). 
insignificant means that you cannot do a 
particular part for a short while. 
harmless means that this incident does not affect 
the questioned. 
does not apply means that this incident cannot 
affect the component. 
 

















cybercrime_opportunity_costs To what extent do you agree with the statements 
below? 
 
5 point Likert  










1. Due to concerns about the safety of the 
Internet, I have done online banking less 
often or no longer the last 12 months. 
2. Due to concerns about the safety of the 
Internet, I have done online shopping 
less often or no longer the last 12 
months. 
3. Due to concerns about the safety of the 
Internet, I have used social networks 
less often or no longer the last 12 
months. 




How much do you estimate you spend to defend 
you(r family) against all cybercrimes (malware, 
scams, hacking and monitoring) last year? (e.g. 
€10). 
Open question  
+ “I don’t know” 
€67,72 €67,60  
Security_measures_taken Do you take one or more of the following security 
measures to defend you(r family) against such 
phenomena (malware, scams, hacking, 
monitoring) (multiple answers possible) 
1. Install free software e.g. anti-virus 
program, anti-spyware, anti-phishing 
crypto, backup software 
2. Install paying software e.g. anti-virus 
program, anti-spyware, anti-phishing 
crypto, backup software 
3. Set up software provided by operating 
system (e.g. firewall, defender) 
4. Update software and operating systems 
5. Secure Wi-Fi network 
6. Use hard-to-guess passwords for 
accounts and home network 






I don’t do this 
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8. Be on guard when giving personal 
information to third party 
9. Reduce Internet usage 
10. Avoid or stop certain activities online 
e.g. online banking, downloading ... 
 
For certain constructs, the sample size of that question is added to the construct. This is because in those constructs were asked at a certain type of respondent 
(e.g. victims of malware…) or there was an option to answer “I don’t know”, “I don’t do this” or “I don’t pay any money”. Because these answers would 
influence the means and standard deviations enormously these were not included in the calculations. It is, however, important to note that these values are 
talking about a part of the total sample. 
*because of the theoretical value of response efficacy of cybercrime in general there is chosen to keep this construct even if the Cronbach’s Alpha is not above 
the 0,7 threshold.  
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*Monitoring is not included as a cybercrime 
































































































































€ 0 €1-€50 €51-€100 €101-€250 €251-€1000 €1000+
Malware
OEI 16,0% 27,8% 0,0% 11,1% 0,0% 66,7%
PEI 25,9% 22,2% 28,6% 44,4% 0,0% 0,0%
IUI 24,7% 22,2% 28,6% 11,1% 0,0% 33,3%
PDI 23,5% 22,2% 42,9% 11,1% 100,0% 0,0%
ODI 9,9% 5,6% 0,0% 22,2% 0,0% 0,0%






















Malware: direct monetary costs by cluster 
€ 0 €1-€50 €51-€100 €101-€250 €251-€1000 €1000+
Scams
OEI 25,5% 40,0% 7,7% 22,2% 14,3% 22,2%
PEI 12,8% 40,0% 23,1% 22,2% 0,0% 33,3%
IUI 12,8% 20,0% 30,8% 33,3% 28,6% 22,2%
PDI 34,0% 0,0% 38,5% 11,1% 57,1% 22,2%
ODI 14,9% 0,0% 0,0% 11,1% 0,0% 0,0%























Scams: direct monetary costs by cluster 





€ 0 €1-€50 €51-€100 €101-€250 €251-€1000 €1000+
Hacking
OEI 11,7% 37,5% 50,0% 0,0% 33,3% 100,0%
PEI 21,3% 25,0% 0,0% 25,0% 0,0% 0,0%
IUI 17,0% 12,5% 0,0% 0,0% 33,3% 0,0%
PDI 34,0% 12,5% 50,0% 75,0% 0,0% 0,0%
ODI 16,0% 12,5% 0,0% 0,0% 33,3% 0,0%























Hacking: direct monetary costs by cluster
ODI PDI IUI PEI OEI Total (n)
€ 0 €1-€50 €51-€100 €101-€250 €251-€1000 €1000+
Monitoring
OEI 13,7% 50,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 50,0%
PEI 21,4% 16,7% 33,3% 100,0% 100,0% 0,0%
IUI 19,1% 16,7% 33,3% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
PDI 32,8% 0,0% 33,3% 0,0% 0,0% 50,0%
ODI 13,0% 16,7% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%




















Monitoring: direct monetary costs by cluster
ODI PDI IUI PEI OEI Total (n)
